Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 2

Article

2013

Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts
S. Todd Brown
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
S. Todd Brown, Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 391 (2013)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

PLAINTIFF CONTROL AND DOMINATION IN
MULTIDISTRICT MASS TORTS
S. TODD BROWN*

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 392
II. MULTIDISTRICT CONSOLIDATION AND THE
MODERN MASS TORT .......................................................... 395
A. Pretrial Consolidation Under Section 1407 ................ 395
B. Selecting Lead Counsel and Managing Dissent .......... 397
C. Discovery, Bellwether Trials, and Settlement
Framing ....................................................................... 399
D. Global Settlement in Multidistrict Litigation............... 401
III. PRIVATE POWER RELATIONS IN THE MASS TORT
MDL.................................................................................... 402
A. Plaintiffs, Counsel, and Lead Counsel ........................ 402
B. The Autonomy Problem in Multidistrict
Settlement..................................................................... 403
C. The Structural and Systemic Dominance of
Repeat Players ............................................................. 405
1. Shaping the Agenda.............................................. 406
2. Influencing Preferences Through
Information Control .............................................. 408
3. Claim Pool Flooding and Plaintiff Preferences .... 409
4. Constraining Opt-Out Options ............................. 413
5. Political Considerations ........................................ 414
D. The Limited Checks on Domination ............................ 415
1. Plaintiff Oversight and Referrals .......................... 415
2. Judicial Oversight ................................................. 416
IV. THE PROBLEM OF REPEAT PLAYER DOMINATION ................ 418
A. Domination, Conflicts, and Competition ..................... 419
1. The Failure of the Common Good
Emphasis .............................................................. 419
2. Repeat Player Expertise and Plaintiffs’
Interests ................................................................ 422
*

Associate Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Business Transactions,
University at Buffalo School of Law. The author wishes to thank Christine Bartholomew,
Mark Bartholomew, Matt Dimick, James Gardner, Michael Halberstam, Lynn Mather,
Anthony O’Rourke, Chris Pashler, John Henry Schlegel, Matt Steilen, Rick Su, and Jim
Wooten for insightful comments and critiques that assisted in the preparation of this Article.
All errors and omissions are the author’s own.

391

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

1

392

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:391

3. Competition and Distortion of the Mass
Tort ....................................................................... 424
B. Plaintiff Rights, Attorney Dominance, and
Legitimacy ................................................................... 426
V. RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND LIMITATIONS ......... 431
A. A Model for Collective Voice in QuasiClass Action ................................................................. 432
1. Creditors’ Committees in Chapter 11 ................... 432
2. Constitution and Functions of Plaintiffs’
Oversight Committees .......................................... 434
3. Selection of Committee Representatives .............. 435
4. Responsibilities .................................................... 436
5. Committee Counsel .............................................. 436
B. Advantages in Litigation and Settlement ..................... 437
1. Plaintiff Monitoring and Conflicts of
Interest .................................................................. 437
2. Improved Decision Making in Settlement............ 437
C. Potential Objections and Limitations .......................... 438
1. Plaintiff Sophistication and Participation ............. 439
2. Committee Counsel Domination .......................... 440
3. Waste and Delay................................................... 440
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 441
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions concerning preclusion doctrine stress the
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.”1
Nonetheless, “properly conducted class actions”2 are a recognized exception to this
general rule because such actions ensure that nonparties are “adequately represented
by someone with the same interests who was a party to the suit.”3 Mass torts,
however, frequently involve numerous plaintiffs with diverse legal and factual issues
that are not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”4 Thus,
it may be reasonably feared that the Court’s firm insistence on preserving individual

1

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40 (1940)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (vacating
certification of a Title VII gender discrimination class action for lack of “the existence of any
common question” across the class); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)
(certification of a limited fund asbestos class action inappropriate given the numerous
individual issues and intra-class conflicts); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997) (rejecting certification of asbestos class action).
2

Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (recognizing six exceptions to the day in court ideal).

3

Id.

4

Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 623.
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autonomy will deny plaintiffs the economies of scale and other benefits of class
actions that make it economically viable to advance their claims.5
Although repeat players6 have largely abandoned the mass tort class action, they
have effectively modified other aggregative devices to operate in largely the same
manner as class actions—so much so that some have characterized them as “quasiclass actions.”7 Asbestos bankruptcies, for example, are often controlled by one or
more of the lawyers who advanced the Amchem and Ortiz settlement class actions,
follow the same basic settlement design, and are otherwise functionally equivalent to
the settlements rejected by the Court in those cases.8 And plaintiffs’ lawyers in these
quasi-class actions tend to enjoy substantially all of the leverage and economies of
scale as they should expect to find in a class action.
This trend toward converting other forms of aggregation into quasi-class actions
is perhaps most evident in federal multidistrict consolidation under 28 U.S.C. §
1407, which has become the most common mechanism for the collective
management and settlement of mass tort matters in the last decade.9 Unlike a class
5

See, e.g., Sergio Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059 (2012)
(criticizing the Court’s focus on individual autonomy and advancing a deterrence-centered
model for evaluating due process in the mass tort setting).
6
As used herein, the term “repeat players” refers to plaintiffs’ lawyers and other
professionals who specialize in aggregate litigation.
7

Judges and commentators have used the term “quasi-class actions” to liken non-class
aggregation to class actions. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268,
271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has many of the characteristics
of a class action; it may be characterized properly as a quasi-class action subject to the general
equitable power of the court."); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611-12
(E.D.L.A. 2008) ("[T]he Vioxx global settlement may properly be analyzed as occurring in a
quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable authority . . . ."); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 95, n.22
(2011); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
480-81 (1994) ("What is clear from the huge consolidations required in mass torts is that they
have many of the characteristics of class actions. . . . It is my conclusion . . . that mass
consolidations are in effect quasi-class actions. Obligations to claimants, defendants, and the
public remain much the same whether the cases are gathered together by bankruptcy
proceedings, class actions, or national or local consolidations.").
8
Accord Samuel Isacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
210 (“To the untutored eye, the 524(g) workout looks strikingly similar to the efforts to obtain
a judicial imprimatur for work-outs of present and future claims, as were struck down in
Amchem and Ortiz. For good reason, as it appears that way to the tutored eye as well. The
practical effect is that an agreement broadly supported by present claimants can be used to
cram down the claims not only of dissenting plaintiffs, but of future claimants as well. The
bankruptcy work-out includes a Future Claimants Representative who assumes a fiduciary
responsibility. But the major difference is that the statutory scheme substitutes an Article I
judge for an Article III judge, hardly a stirring form of enhanced protection for the due process
interests that are at stake.”).
9

See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex
Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2057 (2011)
(“[M]ass tort actions that cannot be litigated as class actions because individual issues of
causation and injury predominate over common issues are often aggregated using the MDL
device.”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

3

394

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:391

action, where the wide range of individual issues among prospective class members
will often preclude certification,10 even substantial legal and factual differences
among plaintiffs’ claims do not preclude consolidation in multidistrict litigation.11
Rather, the focus is whether transferring and consolidating the cases will serve “the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct
of such actions.”12 The great weakness of section 1407, however, is that it lacks any
direct structural mechanism for compelling plaintiffs to act in their collective—as
opposed to individual—self-interest, which may either allow defendants to “divide
and conquer”13 the claim pool or preclude favorable settlements from obtaining
sufficient support to become final.14 That said, the absence of such a structural
mechanism is more an inconvenience than an insurmountable barrier; repeat players
exercise—and continue to build upon—the tools available to them to maintain
cohesion and obtain sufficient consent to settle even the most diverse and complex
mass tort cases today.
Yet in capturing much of what makes the class action viable, the quasi-class
multidistrict tort model also strips plaintiffs of the means of protecting their own
interests from overreaching repeat players. Viewed from the perspective of relative
power relations, the Court’s class action cases that have emphasized the value of
preserving the “day in court” involved matters in which repeat players—class
counsel, for example—so fully dominated the process that disempowered plaintiffs’
interests could not be adequately represented. In the asbestos class actions of the late
1990s, for example, the intrinsic conflicts among current and future class members
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108 (2010)
(marking the growth of the quasi-class action); John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel:
Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2232 (2008) (Chair of the Judicial Panel of
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) noting transition of some litigants to the MDL process given
the limitations on class actions and the growth of open Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) dockets
from 161 in 1997 to 297 in 2007).
10
See, e.g., Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not be Televised,
12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665 (2011); Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of
Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 794 (2010) (“[I]t has
become exceedingly difficult to certify a class in the context of a mass tort.”); Myriam Gilles,
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action,
104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).
11
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Defective Spark Plug & 3-Valve Engine Prods. Liab.
Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (“Section 1407 does not require a complete
identity or even a majority of common factual issues as a prerequisite to centralization.”)
(citing In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009)); In re
Wright Med. Tech., Inc., Conserve Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1371
(J.P.M.L. 2012) (noting that “almost all injury litigation involve questions of causation that
are case- and plaintiff-specific” and concluding “[s]uch differences have not been an
impediment to centralization in the past”); In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig.,
717 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (noting that product liability cases usually
involve “multiple individualized fact issues,” but that does not preclude consolidation).
12

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).

13

See, e.g., Sergio Campos, The Future of Mass Torts . . . and How to Stop it, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNumbra 231, 233 (2011).
14

See infra Part III.B.
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raised serious doubts that all of the various subclasses’ interests would be
protected.15 The quasi-class Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) may ostensibly preserve
plaintiffs’ rights to exclude themselves from any settlement, but the private
mechanisms employed by repeat players to compel consent do no less violence to
disempowered plaintiffs’ rights than the structural mechanisms found in mandatory
class actions.
My objective in this Article is to examine the manner in which repeat player
domination is achieved in non-binding global mass tort settlements in multidistrict
litigation. Thus, Part II begins with an overview of the rise of the modern mass tort,
how these matters are swept into and progress in federal multidistrict litigation, and
the structural limits of section 1407 once settlement is reached. Part III addresses the
role of repeat players and the tools that lead counsel can employ to effectively
foreclose plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain resolutions on the merits when they are
dissatisfied with the global settlement. Part IV examines the combined effect of the
structure of section 1407 and these tools on plaintiffs’ rights and the perceived
legitimacy of the process. Finally, Part V proposes a distinct model for aggregate
governance in multidistrict mass tort litigation that balances the need for cohesion
and finality against the need to preserve and enhance plaintiffs’ voice and exit
options.
II. MULTIDISTRICT CONSOLIDATION AND THE MODERN MASS TORT
A. Pretrial Consolidation Under Section 1407
A popular account of the life cycle of a mass tort breaks it into an immature
stage, where uncertainty about how courts and juries are likely to resolve the basic
legal or medical issues common to all claims remains, and the mature stage, at which
a consensus concerning these issues is more or less established. It is fair to
characterize a mass tort as mature when “there has been full and complete discovery,
multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs’ contentions.”16 At
this point, “little or no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review
of any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial
strategies has been exhausted.”17 After a tort matures, parties tend to focus on
settlement according to established precedent and practice rather than continued
litigation.
At the immature stage, firms will have little guidance for evaluating the risk of
success or failure, making the risk of developing a large number of claims
substantial.18 Accordingly, we should expect to see relatively limited investment in
client recruiting efforts prior to maturity. Conversely, investment in a given mass
tort will accelerate as it approaches and enters into the mature stage because the
prospects for success concerning these core items will become less uncertain. The
15
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856-58 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-27 (1997).
16
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659
(1989).
17

Id.

18

Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
525, 528, n.12 (2007).
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demand for streamlined settlement increases as the volume of claims increases.
This, in turn, may lead to an influx of dubious claims.19
Although caution may have been the mantra in the 1970s and 1980s, the largescale client solicitation efforts that once began in earnest only after signs of litigation
success begin today within hours of a catastrophic event, announcement of a
potential product defect, or other sign that a new mass tort will emerge in the near
future.20 Depending on the specific circumstances of the emerging mass tort, the
defendant may first experience anywhere from a few individual lawsuits to a sudden
deluge of individual and class actions across the country in the months that follow.
Increasingly, however, attorney efforts to build sizeable claim portfolios21 precede
any significant litigation activity once one of these catalysts occurs.22
The trend in recent years has been for one or more parties to petition the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate facially distinct and
geographically diverse cases within a centralized court very early in the tort’s life
cycle.23 Absent the constraints of Rule 23,24 repeat players in the plaintiffs’ bar
increasingly move for multidistrict consolidation early in the belief that they can
obtain consolidation in a friendly transferee court,25 where they may stand a better

19

See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlements, 42 U. MEM. L. REV.
559 (2012) (outlining the manner in which predictability encourages practices that generate
specious claims); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of
Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 188 (2001)
(“In mature mass torts, where there may be a widely-shared understanding of the value of
certain types of claims, thousands of lesser-value claims may be resolved en masse according
to negotiated schedules of damages that pay little attention to individual claim differences and
involve little adversarial litigation.”); McGovern, supra note 16, at 688.
20

See LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY
COST AMERICA 253-54 (2011).
21
The term “claim portfolio” refers to the collective pool of claims controlled by the
lawyer. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 533 (2003)
(“Regardless of whether plaintiffs’ claims are formally aggregated, the lawyer representing
many similarly situated clients necessarily handles the litigation on a group basis. In
preparing pleadings, conducting discovery, retaining experts, preparing for trial, and
negotiating settlement, the lawyer addresses the plaintiffs’ claims primarily as a group.”).
22

See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts in the Real World:
A Rebuttal to the Mandatory Class Actions Idea, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 237, 237-38
(2011).
23
See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“As
use of the class action device to aggregate claims has become more difficult, MDL
consolidation has increased in importance as a means of achieving final, global resolution of
mass national disputes.”); see also Interview with Hon. John G. Heyburn, Panel Promotes Just
and Efficient Conduct of Litigation (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
General_Info/Third_Branch_Interviews/The_Third_Branch_-_February-2010-Heyburn_Inter
view.pdf (noting the trend toward centralization under section 1407 and the panel’s efforts to
shorten the time between the filing of a motion for consolidation and a decision).
24

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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chance of obtaining leadership appointments and avoiding unfavorable rulings.26
Defendants may also favor early consolidation instead of suffering the business
disruption and expense of coordinating the defense of multiple cases spread across
potentially dozens of jurisdictions.27
B. Selecting Lead Counsel and Managing Dissent
Once the underlying cases are consolidated within a federal MDL, the transferee
court will typically focus first on the selection of lead counsel. As the JPML guide
for MDL judges notes, “Early organization of the counsel who have filed the various
cases is a critical case-management task.”28 The transferee courts tend to issue
pretrial case management orders early in the case and, once appointed, press lead
counsel to advance discovery plans promptly. At this point, the court may rule on a
broad range of pretrial matters, including discovery disputes, early dispositive
motions, and Daubert29 and other evidentiary issues.
The competition for leadership roles in the MDL usually begins before the JPML
authorizes consolidation.30 Repeat players must recruit aggressively31 and “can
spend as much time jockeying for position among their rivals as they do attacking
corporate wrongdoers.”32 Within the relatively small community of repeat players
who dominate multidistrict mass tort cases,33 relationships and understandings are
25
The court that is selected to oversee the MDL proceedings is referred to as the
“transferee court” to reflect the fact that the cases are transferred to the court for pretrial
proceedings consistent with section 1407. Conversely, the courts in which the cases were
filed and may be returned upon the conclusion of the MDL proceedings are referred to as the
“transferor courts.”
26

See generally Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL: A Defense Perspective, 24
LITIG. 43 (1998).
27

See generally id.

28

FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 10 (2011); see also JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIG. & FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES 2 (2009), [hereinafter MDL GUIDE],
available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/TenSteps-MDLGuide-2009-Transferee_Judges.pdf
(noting that appointment of lead counsel is one of the first and “most important decisions” the
MDL judge must make).
29

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

30

Gary Wilson et al., The Future of Products Liability in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 85, 108 (2000) (describing contests for steering committee roles as “Washington-styled
lobbying”).
31
See Erichson, supra note 22, at 238; Douglas McCollam, Slick on Slick, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2010, at 44 (“As the term implies, a key to influence in a mass tort is achieving mass.
From the moment a cataclysm like BP's Deepwater Horizon blowout occurs, a trial lawyer is
on the clock. How much power he can wield in the expanding litigation is often determined,
or at least influenced, by how many clients he has and how quickly he gets to court.”).
32

McCollam, supra note 31, at 44.

33

See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation
of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 172 (2004) (discussing
concentration of control by lead firms across different mass torts); Samuel Issacharoff,
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formed across cases, altering the manner in which these repeat players manage the
case, assign potentially lucrative common benefit work and negotiate settlement
terms. Although these appointments are technically within the discretion of the judge
overseeing the MDL,34 the participating firms and lawyers frequently enjoy
considerable influence in the selection.35 In some cases, participants will agree to the
entire composition of the steering committee and iron out any objections before
presenting a list to the judge.36 Alternatively, the judge may make the initial steering
committee and other leadership appointments without deferring to the lawyers
involved but leave the final decisions concerning specific work assignments in the
MDL to be worked out among counsel.37

“Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2002) (“The plaintiffs’ market operates through an elaborate referral
system that concentrates cases in the hands of a small number of repeat-player firms.”); Steve
Baughman Jensen, Like Lemonade, Ethics Comes Best When it’s Old-Fashioned: A Response
to Professor Moore, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 216-17 (1999) (“Finally, mass tort victims benefit
from joint representation because, through the referral process, their claims tend eventually to
be handled by the most-qualified lawyers, those who have specialized in their specific type of
litigation. As an illustration, we need look only to the familiar example of the asbestos cases,
which have now been consolidated in the hands of no more than approximately twenty law
firms around the country that devote most of their resources to asbestos litigation and are
highly proficient at handling asbestos-related injury claims.”); Herrman, supra note 26, at 47
(“Particularly in mass tort MDLs, there are certain prominent lawyers who are named
repeatedly to the plaintiffs' steering committees.”).
34

Over time, the Manual For Complex Litigation has shifted from suggesting control over
selection for lead counsel by “parties having a common interest” to encouraging judges to take
“an active part in making decisions on the appointment of counsel.” See MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92, 4.53 (1982) (stating that "Lead counsel are chosen by
the groups of parties having a common interest"; in "exceptional circumstances" or when the
parties fail to choose, courts may do so); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) §
20.224 (1985) (advising judges to oversee appointment of steering committees); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §§ 20.222, 20.224 (1995) (recommending that judges take "an
active part in making the decisions on the appointment of counsel"); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.244 (2004) (same).
35

For example, as the Wall Street Journal explained in the Toyota MDL:

Judge Selna will have the final say on which lawyers will take the lead in the case.
Judges usually allow lawyers to first duke it out among themselves, then rely on a
slate presented to them. Judge Selna has appointed three interim lead attorneys who
have put together a slate of lawyers to take the lead after a series of attorney meetings
in a Newport Beach, Calif., restaurant, a Chicago hotel and a Las Vegas casino to
fight for positions.
Dionne Searcey, Lawyers Wrestle Over Driver's Seat in Litigation Against Toyota, WALL ST.
J., May 5, 2010, at A1.
36
In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp.
2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011).
37

See Order No. 5, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales
Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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A critical objective at this stage is to ensure that the lawyers work together and
advance the collective interests of the claim pool in a cohesive fashion.38 This goal
is advanced, in part, by assigning key leadership roles to influential repeat players
and providing them with largely unfettered control over the proceedings.39 It is
reinforced by judicial control over the purse strings—judges overseeing multidistrict
litigation routinely order a percentage of the fees lawyers earn from the case set
aside to pay for the costs incurred by lead and other counsel in connection with the
MDL.40 After the fund is established, the court typically asks lead counsel (or a
special committee comprised of attorneys who have served in the MDL) to
recommend allocations to the lawyers who have worked on the case. The transferee
court, of course, has final say over any allocations from the fund. Thus, as others
have noted previously, the lawyers and firms involved have strong incentives to
avoid appearing disruptive or uncooperative.41
C. Discovery, Bellwether Trials, and Settlement Framing
Efficient discovery and consistency of pretrial rulings are central to purpose of
section 1407, and the transferee judge has broad discretion in designing the
discovery plan.42 In complex matters involving both common and distinct issues,
transferee judges frequently adopt staggered discovery plans that appear to both
prioritize discovery into core matters first and allow for adaptation in future stages to
account for discoveries in earlier stages.43 Pursuing multiple lines of discovery at
once is, of course, permissible, but doing so may not be viewed as efficient at the
outset, particularly in cases that are consolidated shortly after the triggering event
gave rise to the action.
38

Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2000 (2011) (discussing this focus is geared toward
advancing global settlement and works against advancing cases for actual trial).
39

See, e.g., id. at 1986.

40
Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010).
41

See, e.g., id. at 109-10 (“In practical effect, MDL judges are lead lawyers' clients. Feerelated concerns also cause non-lead lawyers to fear MDL judges, who take from them the
money lead lawyers receive. By challenging an MDL judge, a non-lead lawyer must be
willing to risk retribution in the form of a heavy fee tax. Because judges leave the size of
forced fee transfers open until litigation ends, obedience is the prudent course for non-lead
lawyers until an MDL formally concludes—or even longer when non-lead lawyers have cases
in other MDLs being handled by the same judge.”). Likewise, those who attempt to
undermine lead counsel outside of court may suffer because judges increasingly request input
on fee allocation decisions from the lead lawyers in the case. See In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2002 WL 32154197, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2002) (MDL 1203)
(collecting cases).
42

See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 1077
(J.P.M.L. 1977).
43
See, e.g., Order No. 5, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing,
Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (MDL 2151) (“It
is expected that discovery on foundational issues during Phase I will enable the parties to
develop a more narrowly tailored discovery plan for subsequent phases of this litigation and to
be more focused, economical and efficient in subsequent phases of discovery.”).
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Following discovery, MDL courts frequently schedule a series of bellwether
trials rather than remand the cases to the forums from whence they came.44 The
purpose is not to achieve global finality through trial; indeed, such an approach
exceeds the limits of the ostensibly pretrial work of the MDL court.45 Rather, these
trials are intended “to provide meaningful information and experience to everyone
involved in the litigations.”46 And Judges Fallon, Grabill and Wynne recently
explained:
Bellwether trials thus assist in the maturation of any given dispute by
providing an opportunity for coordinating counsel to organize the
products of pretrial common discovery, evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and
costs associated with the litigation. Indeed, the utilization of bellwether
jury trials can enhance and accelerate the MDL process in two key
respects. First, bellwether trials allow coordinating counsel to hone their
presentation for subsequent trials and can lead to the development of “trial
packages” for use by local counsel upon the dissolution of MDLs.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, bellwether trials can precipitate
and inform settlement negotiations by indicating future trends, that is, by
providing guidance on how similar claims may fare before subsequent
juries.47
Ideally, then, bellwether trials will not merely accelerate global resolution; rather,
global settlement will occur because they effectively accelerate the perceived
maturity of the litigation.48
44

Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 609
(2012).
45

See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 497 F.3d 1005, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007)
("We recognize that the results of the Hanford bellwether trial are not binding on the
remaining plaintiffs."); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000) ("There
is no indication in the record before us that the parties understood the first trial would decide
specific issues to bind subsequent trials."); In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 725 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Absent a positive manifestation of agreement by Non-Trial Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude
that their Seventh Amendment right is not compromised by extending a summary judgment
against the Trial Plaintiffs to the non-participating, non-trial plaintiff."); Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 318 (5th Cir. 1998); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 20.132 (2004) ("The transferee court could conduct a bellwether trial of a
centralized action or actions originally filed in the transferee district, the results of which (1)
may, upon the consent of parties to constituent actions not filed in the transferee district, be
binding on those parties and actions, or (2) may otherwise promote settlement in the
remaining actions." (footnote omitted)).
46
Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2323, 2332 (2008); see also Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006).
47

Fallon et al., supra note 46, at 2338.

48

See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 123, 124 (2012) (“A private mass tort settlement begins as a contractual agreement
between plaintiffs' liaison counsel and the defendant(s) involved in a particular mass tort
litigation that sets forth a negotiated settlement offer for each individual plaintiff to consider.
The substance of the settlement offer consists of a commitment by the defendant(s) to pay a
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Regardless of whether this idealized vision of the process reflects settlement
premised upon the true maturation of the tort or merely provides a baseline for
structuring a global settlement in lieu of true maturation, the result is frequently the
same: bellwether trials are highly effective at promoting global settlement.49 Indeed,
the very threat of bellwether trials appears to have a comparable effect on promoting
settlement even where the process has not yielded anything that could be reasonably
characterized as transforming the tort into “mature” status.50
D. Global Settlement in Multidistrict Litigation
At settlement, the intrinsic systemic limitations of section 1407 are perhaps most
problematic for defendants and lead plaintiffs’ counsel. Although section 1407
contemplates that settlement may occur before remand to transferor courts,51 it does
not provide a mechanism for binding non-consenting plaintiffs to the settlement’s
terms. If the facts of the case permit, the MDL judge may oversee one or more
limited settlement class actions filed in the transferee court, but the judge cannot
self-assign cases for trial.52 In short, section 1407 lacks any direct structural
framework for ensuring that the matter can be resolved once and for all through
litigation or global settlement in the transferee court.
The absence of a clear procedural framework for settlement is not surprising
given the stated purpose of section 1407: pretrial consolidation. Although such
sweeping consolidations may provide a forum that encourages private resolution as a
practical matter, any resolution on the substantive merits remains the function of
individual or properly certified class action trials. As noted previously, it is this
potential—the plaintiffs’ power to control the ultimate decision to proceed to trial or
fixed amount to the current aggregate plaintiff population, with individual awards varying
based on the strength of each plaintiff's claim as determined by the allocation of "points"
among the plaintiffs by a neutral administrator pursuant to negotiated—and often very
complex—formulas and grids. Those settlement formulas and grids tend to be based on realworld information and experience gained through discovery, pretrial rulings, and bellwether
jury trials, all of which increasingly occur in the context of a multidistrict litigation proceeding
created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. In other words, private mass tort settlements often
await and account for the maturation of the litigation.”).
49
See, e.g., Effron, supra note 9, at 2057 (“Although the transferee judge must send cases
back to the original district for trial, the MDL is a powerful aggregation device because most
cases settle before trial.”); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex
Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 n.4 (2008) ("Few
cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.").
50

Two recent cases, the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation and the Deepwater
Horizon litigation, were settled shortly before the first bellwether trials in those cases were
scheduled to begin. John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP Oil Spill, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, at A1 (settlement announced three days before the first phase of the
Deepwater Horizon bellwether trials were scheduled to begin); Mireya Navarro, Deal is
Reached on Health Costs of 9/11 Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1 (WTC
settlement reached roughly two months before bellwether trials were scheduled to begin).
51
28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 2012) (requiring remand of a transferred case once pretrial
work is completed “unless it shall have been previously terminated”).
52

See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)
(noting that MDL judge may not self-assign a case for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
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settle once pretrial work is done—that allows section 1407 consolidations to avoid
the restraints that preclude similarly sweeping mass tort class actions. Although this
potential recommends multidistrict consolidation early in the proceedings, it
suggests that the post-consolidation stage will break down into dozens, hundreds or
thousands of individual actions and settlements that may involve additional
discovery, repetitive litigation concerning similar issues across forums, and
inconsistent rulings concerning these issues. In sum, section 1407 can bring the
claim pool to the settlement finish line, but it does not provide the court with the
power to make the plaintiffs cross it.
III. PRIVATE POWER RELATIONS IN THE MASS TORT MDL
No discussion of aggregative procedures is complete without a practical
assessment of the manner in which these procedures alter power relations among the
parties. Yet the literature concerning the shifting power relations in aggregate
litigation is incomplete. The focus is most often on the relative economies of scale
and power imbalance between defendants and plaintiffs in the absence of
aggregation. But another important shift in power relations—among plaintiffs, their
personal counsel and the lawyers who control the MDL proceedings—is an essential
element in the transformation of these pretrial proceedings into a mechanism for
achieving global private settlements.53
The focus here is not to revisit lead lawyers’ unfettered control over the
plaintiffs’ side of the litigation within the MDL. Rather, it is how this control,
combined with the dynamics of mass tort litigation recruiting and networks
generally, allows lead counsel to bridge the gap between the structural limits of
section 1407 and the need for finality in structuring any global settlement.
A. Plaintiffs, Counsel, and Lead Counsel
The quasi-class MDL may bear several similarities to the class action, but its
very existence is the product of the limits of traditional class actions. In a properly
certified class action, the representative plaintiffs’ interests are largely the same as—
or at least not in conflict with—the other members of the class.54 As recognized in
Amchem and Ortiz, however, mass torts frequently involve numerous plaintiffs with
diverse legal and factual issues that are not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.”55 Thus, the quasi-class MDL begins not only with
the recognition that individual plaintiffs may have different interests in the

53

RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT ix (2007) (“One
significant facet of the mass tort phenomenon consists of the emergence and operation of an
elite segment of the personal injury plaintiffs’ bar. These lawyers specialize in the
identification, development, and comprehensive resolution of whole categories of mass tort
disputes. The story of this mass tort plaintiffs’ bar—indeed, the intense, competitive
relationship among such law firms—is as much a part of the mass tort world as legal
doctrine.”).
54

See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry
into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 588-89 (discussing certification
standards as a means of avoiding conflicts between the representative plaintiff or class counsel
and the interests of other class members).
55

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
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proceedings56 but also that these diverse interests are entitled to independent
representation.
Consolidations under section 1407 do not strip individual plaintiffs of their
chosen counsel with respect to their individual claims, but such consolidations alter
plaintiffs’ potential to monitor developments that affect their interests. The client
solicitation and referral practices57 that are common in mass tort litigation frequently
place one attorney in control of multiple claims against the same defendants even
without formal consolidation. Some of these lawyers, in turn, assume leadership
positions on the steering committees established to represent the claim pool
collectively. Thus, lawyers with whom an individual plaintiff does not have a
relationship may make many of the most significant decisions concerning her case.
The net result is that MDLs involve lawyers who enjoy influence over the
direction of the case and the terms of the settlement, on the one hand, and
disempowered lawyers who lack such influence on the other. Some disempowered
lawyers may be conciliatory—hoping to leverage their compliance with the dictates
of lead counsel into common benefit work assignments in the instant case or future
cases. Others, however, may assume a more aggressive posture—using the claims
they control to undermine any settlement or, at least, exact preferential treatment—in
order to discourage other repeat players from excluding them from the negotiating
table. Effective MDL management on the plaintiffs’ side demands not only
cooperation among lead counsel but also careful attention to the demands of
disempowered lawyers who may control sufficient claim volumes to undermine any
proposed settlement.
B. The Autonomy Problem in Multidistrict Settlement
The inability to bind all plaintiffs to a global settlement under section 1407
presents an obvious problem: defendants will not enter into a global settlement if
they cannot be reasonably certain that it will bring peace.58 Plaintiffs with the
strongest claims will simply allow their claims to return to the transferor court and
proceed with litigation, while those with weaker claims accept the settlement’s
terms.59 This tendency toward adverse selection in a non-binding global settlement
is compounded where the very fact of settlement generates more claims, leading to
rampant oversubscription against the settlement without making a significant dent in
the defendant’s potential liability to those advancing strong claims.60 In sum, no
matter how bad reverting to scattered litigation across multiple jurisdictions may be
for the defendant, a wide-open global settlement that preserves opt-out rights is
likely to be worse.
Another problem is the risk that “holdout plaintiffs” will threaten to reject the
settlement unless they receive preferential treatment. This threat only has force to
the extent that the plaintiffs exercising it have the power to undermine the
56

See supra note 11.

57

Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863 (2005).
58

See NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 12.

59

Brown, supra note 19, at 587-91.

60

Id. at 602-05.
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settlement, and few global settlements demand 100% acceptance.61 The real threat is
that one or more disempowered attorneys representing several plaintiffs will,
individually or collectively, reject the settlement in their clients’ names or persuade
their clients to reject the settlement due to misinformation or promises of greater
potential recoveries down the road.
The fen-phen national settlement is a stark example of these problems in action.62
Although plaintiffs had the ability to opt out of the settlement, it was well funded
(initially, at $3.75 billion) and included multiple provisions designed to preclude
oversubscription.63 Nonetheless, the settlement received more qualifying claims than
was statistically believed to be possible,64 and several plaintiffs opted out. In short, it
was a disastrous settlement for the defendant, who, to date, has incurred litigation
and settlement costs well in excess of $20 billion.65
Merck’s initial strategy with respect to the Vioxx personal injury mass tort—
litigate every case,66 may thus be seen as a rational response to the fen-phen
settlement debacle, even if some observers were appalled by the approach.67 The
Vioxx case bore substantial similarities to the fen-phen case—millions of regular
users of the drugs, statistically higher rates of certain conditions associated with use
of the drugs, the difficulty in establishing that exposure to the drugs (as opposed to
other causal factors) was or was not a substantial factor in any individual patient’s
injury, and the difficulties in screening out specious claims in any global settlement
–and suggested that even a well-structured global settlement might likewise be
overrun. Instead of pursuing early settlement, Merck litigated eighteen cases to
judgment, winning eleven at trial and enjoying additional success on appeal.68 In the
process, Merck effectively signaled that it would rather pay its lawyers than settle
weak cases; if a global settlement could not be structured to avoid the defendant’s
fate in the fen-phen matter, there would be no settlement at all.
After Merck’s initial success, albeit at great cost to the company,69 the plaintiffs’
steering committee and Merck structured a global settlement that facially preserved
the right to pursue individual litigation but included terms that made it “practically
61

Erichson, supra note 21, at 574.

62

Although fen-phen was technically a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action, its example
is relevant to modern multidistrict litigation given that both afford plaintiffs with the option to
reject global settlement. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 274-75 (2011) (contrasting the Rule 23(b)(3) settlement in
fen-phen against the private settlement in Vioxx).
63

See Brown, supra note 19, at 583-86.

64

See NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 145-46.

65

See Brown, supra note 19, at 586.

66

See Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the
Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 51417 (2008) (discussing Merck’s initial strategy in the Vioxx litigation).
67

See id. at 522-534 (discussing the ethical and moral dimensions of the Merck strategy).

68

Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 278-79.

69

McClellan, supra note 66, at 510 (discussing the “millions of dollars in legal fees and
other trial expenses” spent by Merck in litigating Vioxx cases).
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impossible for a claimant to decline the offer.”70 The settlement included a clause
that allowed the defendant to walk away if less that 85% of eligible claimants in
multiple categories did not participate.71 Lawyers who signed the agreement or
enrolled a client in the program were required to recommend the deal to every
client72 and refuse to represent those who rejected the deal going forward.73 In short,
plaintiffs could choose to walk away, but doing so meant starting over from scratch
without the benefit of their existing counsel or any other attorney with significant
experience in the litigation.
Whatever one thinks of the fen-phen and Vioxx settlements, it is sufficient at this
point to note that they reveal a clear tension between the systemic preference for
global settlement and the private self-interests that, left unchecked, work against it.
If a global settlement is to occur, the defendant must have some assurance of peace.
But peace is one thing that multidistrict litigation is ill equipped to ensure; it lacks
the binding force of bankruptcy or mandatory class actions, and even the best laid
private settlement plans that freely preserve individual autonomy can go horribly
awry.
The Vioxx settlement also provides a stark and frequently criticized example of
how private power relations between plaintiffs and their attorneys can be employed
to bridge the gap between pretrial consolidation and global settlement. Given
Merck’s relative success at trial, however, its “litigate every case” strategy and
apparent commitment to continue along this course in the absence of sufficient
assurances of peace generated considerable uncertainty for plaintiffs’ lawyers and
demanded the use of aggressive private restraints on individual litigants. And
though it is easy to take issue with the overtly coercive terms of the settlement, it is
also easy to see why settling counsel and defendants felt resort to such terms was
necessary under the circumstances.
C. The Structural and Systemic Dominance of Repeat Players
Although section 1407 does not provide any direct structural power to force
plaintiffs to abide by the terms of any global settlement, repeat players enjoy
considerable power to dominate settlement decisions with or without the coercive
terms found in the Vioxx settlement. As Ian Shapiro observed in the political
context:
[D]omination can result from a person’s, or a group’s, shaping agendas,
constraining options, and, in the limiting case, influencing people’s
preferences and desires. Domination can also occur without the need for
explicit commands when one person or group secures the compliance of
another as a by-product of their control of resources that are essential for

70

Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62 (discussing the Vioxx global settlement).

71

See id.

72

See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto, No. 2:0MD01657, 2008 WL 7084949, at § 1.2.8.1. (E.D. La. July 9,
2008) (MD 1657).
73

Id. § 1.2.8.2.
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the second person or group, or, in the terminology I will deploy, is in a
position to threaten their basic interests.74
Although multidistrict consolidation governance is obviously distinct from
political governance in many respects, repeat players enjoy comparable avenues for
domination over plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation. They shape agendas for the
litigation, can manipulate the claim pool’s preferences through information control
and modifying the composition of the pool, have the power to constrain litigation
options during the proceedings, control the options available under any settlement,
and may directly or indirectly limit the resources available for plaintiffs to advance
their interests outside of any settlement.
1. Shaping the Agenda
As noted previously, lead counsel enjoy largely unfettered control over the
plaintiffs’ agenda during multidistrict proceedings. This control is reinforced by
judicial reluctance to interfere with their choices and limited options for
disempowered lawyers and plaintiffs to challenge them.75 Given the extreme
deference the JPML affords transferee courts to retain or return individual cases to
transferor courts, these disempowered participants cannot express their
dissatisfaction through exit as long as lead counsel and the transferee court believe
restraining their exit options advances the claim pool’s objectives. Disempowered
plaintiffs are left with no practical voice and, at best, must wait for months or years
before exit is possible. 76
If we assume that the claim pool is comprised of claims that center on the same
basic legal and factual issues, the fact that a small group of sophisticated counsel
controls the pretrial agenda may not be problematic. But this assumption does not
reflect the reality across mass harm multidistrict proceedings. Plaintiffs within a
claim pool will have conflicting interests in valuing their respective injuries, defining
the criteria for qualifying for settlement, and, ultimately, in choosing to accept or
reject any settlement that is proposed. An attorney may support settlement criteria
that reduce compensation and exit options for some plaintiffs but has the collective
impact of increasing the total returns of the claim portfolio.77
74

IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4 (2003).

75
See, e.g., Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in
Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“Lead attorneys enjoy
plenary and, in many respects, exclusive control of the litigation. Although they report to and
receive input from disabled attorneys, they are independent actors who operate subject to no
one’s control. Disabled lawyers cannot tell lead attorneys what to do; nor can they fire them
for disobedience. If disabled lawyers dislike the way lead lawyers are performing, their only
recourse is to complain to the trial judge, who, for a variety of reasons, is unlikely to be
sympathetic.”).
76
Accord Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 317 (2009)
(discussing statistical improbability that cases will be remanded to transferor courts and
concluding, “when the JPML selects a transferee district and judge for an MDL, there is an
overwhelming chance that it is assigning the constituent actions to their final resting place”).
77

Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos Litigation, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 175, 192 (2003) (“The mass tort lawyer cannot deal with his or her clients on a
one-to-one basis that permits full client participation in the litigation. This diffuse relationship
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For example, in the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, Judge
Hellerstein noted severe conflicts of interests among plaintiffs who were collectively
represented by one of the firms in that case:
Approximately a third of the Plaintiffs had little or no objective injury
traceable to their work at the WTC site, and were in the lowest settlement
tiers. They may have had little or no option except to settle. Other
Plaintiffs, despite contracting serious cancers, were facing the possibility
of small settlement recoveries because of difficulties in proving causal
relation with the toxins at the WTC site, and thus might nevertheless have
wished to proceed to take their chances with Daubert motions and trial.
The Tier IV Plaintiffs, those with serious and lasting ailments strongly
related to their work at the WTC site, although well compensated under
the SPA relative to others, also reasonably could have opted in favor of
trial rather than settlement.78
In light of these concerns, the court readily concluded that their lawyers were not
in position to provide them with the independent advice and counsel they were
entitled to receive.79 Although Judge Hellerstein concluded that these conflicts
demanded judicial intervention in this case,80 courts rarely consider whether similar
diverse interests within an attorney’s claim portfolio warrant comparable protections
in other MDL cases.
Similarly, in the Deepwater Horizon MDL, the claim pool included not only
those advancing the economic and property damages claims that comprised the
majority of the pool but also much smaller groups of plaintiffs whose interests in
discovery and the litigation generally were only partially aligned with this majority.
For example, the claims advanced on behalf of workers who were injured or killed in
the initial explosion were swept into the MDL, delayed as lead counsel investigated
numerous questions that were largely irrelevant to their cases, and further delayed
pending the transferee court’s consideration of the settlement of the economic and
property damage settlements. Many of these victims were struggling financially as a
result of the disaster and ultimately settled their cases individually—without the
additional leverage afforded by trial or even a foreseeable trial date—in order to
inevitably will yield some level of client dissatisfaction and, because of compromises the
attorney must make to formulate strategy for the group as a whole, may result in less-thanzealous advocacy for positions of particular clients.”); Erichson, supra note 21, at 558-59
(“Conflicts of interest in here in collective representation. Unless the plaintiffs' interests are
perfectly aligned, which is rare, a lawyer representing multiple plaintiffs with related claims
inevitably faces decisions about whose interests to advance. As Judge Jack Weinstein has
explained with regard to mass tort litigation, ‘while the attorney representing a large number
of clients might, in theory, be able to reach some approximation of the objectives of the group
as a whole, that attorney cannot possibly account for the varying desires of individual
members of the group.’ In mass litigation, any conflict between individual and group interests
likely presents not only a concurrent client-client conflict, but also a concurrent client-lawyer
conflict. Plaintiffs' lawyers' fees, ordinarily tied to the size of the overall recovery for the
group, give lawyers an economic stake in favoring group interests.”).
78

In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

79

Id.

80

Id..
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address their immediate financial concerns. In these cases, it is easy to see how lead
counsel’s ability to set the agenda and quash dissenting voices may have impacted
the rights and recoveries of a small but severely injured minority.
At this point, my focus is not whether the agenda shaping in the World Trade
Center Disaster Site Litigation or the Deepwater Horizon MDL worked to the
disadvantage of certain minority plaintiffs or whether this is, on balance, undesirable
or illegitimate;81 it is to demonstrate that the power to shape agendas can be decisive
in shaping litigants’ perceptions of their ability to advance their legitimate interests
that are not part of that agenda. Once that agenda is fixed, plaintiffs are most often
powerless to voice their disapproval or exit. Discovery costs and delays may mount
while lead counsel advance issues that concern the majority but are irrelevant to
disempowered plaintiffs, for whom the practical realities of their circumstances may
not allow them to simply wait for a return to the transferor court. And if these
agendas lead to shaping settlements that simultaneously exclude and limit
disempowered plaintiffs’ options to pursue their claims individually, the may not
only lose the potential scale economies of aggregation but also find that proceeding
individually is no longer economically viable.
2. Influencing Preferences Through Information Control
Perhaps the greatest irony of mass tort multidistrict litigation is the degree to
which plaintiffs lack ready access to the pretrial work performed for their benefit.
Although global settlements do not generally contain the same sort of nondisclosure
terms found in many individual settlements, few plaintiffs have both direct access to
the discovery obtained and the time and resources to evaluate it before making the
decision to settle or pursue tail litigation. This information may be filtered through
layers of lawyers, each with interests that may conflict with the plaintiff. And in
cases where global settlements occur before bellwether or other trials, plaintiffs may
have little or no qualitative basis for assessing their prospects at trial.
Qualitative information is, of course, a critical component of any settlement
decision. In traditional litigation, this decision is framed by an assessment of several
factors; including the plaintiff’s objectives in the litigation, the amount she will
receive to forego trial and the specific risks of losing at trial if she proceeds. A
plaintiff’s objectives and expectations are continually reshaped during the course of
the litigation and associated settlement talks, with the plaintiff’s lawyer counseling
the plaintiff concerning developments as they arise in the case and encouraging or
discouraging settlement according to the ever-changing understanding of the case.
The settlement offer tends to be a fixed dollar amount, and its fairness and adequacy
can be assessed by the plaintiff and her counsel based on their respective
understandings of the case when the offer is made.
By contrast, an individual plaintiff’s decision to accept or reject a global
settlement is often burdened by uncertainty about how the settlement will treat her
claim. At the time they must make this decision, plaintiffs usually do not know
whether their respective claims will be approved and, if so, how their injuries will be
classified. Claim processors may interpret settlement language to exclude plaintiffs
who may reasonably believe their claims will be accepted under the same terms.
Moreover, even plaintiffs who are comfortable with their prospects for acceptance
under the settlement’s terms and conditions may not be able to predict whether the
81

See infra Part IV.
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fund will be sufficient to pay all claims promptly or in full. Claims that are selected
for audit may be delayed, and settlements that are oversubscribed may have
provisions allowing the administrator to reduce payments. In short, plaintiffs must
often make the settlement decision before they can know all of the information
relevant to assessing the settlement’s treatment of their claims.
Likewise, notwithstanding the extraordinary amount of resources devoted to
advancing pre-trial matters in the MDL, the plaintiff’s settlement decision is further
complicated by uncertainty about her prospects at trial. Specific information about a
defendant’s conduct and culpability will tend to promote litigation by those
advancing the strongest claims.82 Individual plaintiffs, however, may have only
limited knowledge of the information uncovered during discovery. In settlements
that occur prior to any trials, their ability to calculate the risks of trial in their own
cases will be further limited. The lawyers who are most familiar with all of this
information—those in leadership and other roles in the MDL—may be unreliable
sources of independent advice given their own interests in prompt settlement. In
sum, many plaintiffs must make the settlement decision notwithstanding substantial
uncertainty concerning both the settlement’s treatment of their individual claims and
their prospects for success at trial.
3. Claim Pool Flooding and Plaintiff Preferences
Although frequently overlooked, repeat players’ methods for identifying and
sweeping potential claimants into the proceedings can also have a profound impact
on shaping the collective attitudes and preferences of the claim pool. By shaping the
composition of the claim pool, repeat players can alter the collective voice of the
pool when seeking settlement approval. This potential is most obvious where
individual claims are objectively distinct—the preferences of a large group with one
type of claim overwhelming the preferences of a much smaller group with a distinct
type of claim—but it may also be present where differences of perception among
plaintiffs with comparable objective profiles can be exaggerated and manipulated.
To illustrate, assume three types of plaintiffs who were exposed to a known
carcinogen produced by the same defendant. Victim A has not been diagnosed with
lung cancer but has been told that her chance of developing the disease increased
from 9% to 12% due to her exposure. Victim B has lung cancer but also smoked
two packs of cigarettes a day for more than thirty years. Victim C has a rare form of
lung cancer, which experts have attributed primarily to exposure to the defendant’s
product. We may expect each plaintiff to have different perceptions of, and
objectives within, the litigation and settlement of the case. We may also expect
these perceptions and objectives to guide their level of activity and decisions to
approve or reject settlement.
What we may not expect in this scenario is that Victim A, Victim B, and Victim
C may refer to the same person. This individual’s perception of her interest in the
case is premised upon her realization of the depth of her injury and the
82

Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and
Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 460 (2005) (“Culpability information
is far more useful to a meritorious plaintiff because it has evidentiary value in proving her
case. On the other hand, culpability information is considerably less useful to plaintiffs with
frivolous claims, since they are more likely to try to extract a quick initial settlement (as
opposed to proceeding with litigation).”).
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accountability of the defendant; and it may be based on incomplete information, the
decision to emphasize one fact over another or the refusal to internalize information
due to cognitive biases. Thus, even if the plaintiff has a unique form of cancer that is
attributable primarily to exposure to the defendant’s product, she may not appreciate
the distinction or believe that the defendant caused it. She may not sue, and, if she
does, she may not have the same level of commitment to see the litigation to
conclusion as she would if she had access to perfect information.
This example highlights the vital role that a plaintiff’s perceptions play in
guiding her litigation and settlement decisions. Within the classic naming, blaming
and claiming framework, we ask how injurious experiences become or do not
become perceived (naming), are or are not transformed into grievances (blaming),
and ultimately develop or do not develop into disputes (claiming).83 Each stage
plays a critical role in the transformation of a dispute in traditional personal injury
matters; the case will not arise, we are told, unless the victim perceives an
experience as injurious, attributes fault to another, and decides to advance a claim.84
Plaintiffs who do not perceive actual injuries and attribute them to the
defendant’s conduct, however, may advance claims where they believe they will be
paid under applicable law or settlement criteria. This includes not only those who
submit frivolous claims but also those who advance compensable claims. Although
the law may allow a lung cancer victim to sue Harold’s Auto Parts85 for selling
asbestos-lined brakes, for example, she may have some difficulty accepting that
Harold or his store were to blame for her injury. Applicable law may allow
consumers or workers to assert claims for unrealized economic or physical injuries,
but any resulting payment may be viewed more as a windfall than compensation for
an internalized wrong. Such a disconnect between plaintiff perception and legal
compensability may be particularly strong where, as in the United States, so much of
the public views the civil litigation system as prone to accepting frivolous claims.86
The divide between individual perception and compensability may be most
significant where the damages are small or the purported injury-causing event is
remote, speculative or just one of many possible causes. 87 Although some authors
83

William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 631 (1980-1981).
84

Id.; see also Markus Groth et al., Commitment to Legal Claiming: Influences of
Attributions, Social Guidance, and Organizational Tenure, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 781, 782
(2002) (noting the progression from one stage to the next).
85

This example is taken from the parties in Harold's Auto Parts, Inc., v. Mangialardi, 889
So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004).
86

See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting
the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449-50 (2004) (discussing studies
showing that more than four-fifths of the public believe that many meritless cases are filed in
civil litigation).
87
For example, at the height of asbestos litigation screenings, it was not uncommon to
hear reports of newly minted plaintiffs celebrating findings that they had compensable
asbestos-related disease. In one frequently cited article, a reporter at a screening in Missouri
interviewed several prospective plaintiffs who appeared wholly unconcerned with their
positive “diagnoses.” See Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2003, at A1 (noting that eighteen of the twenty merely saw the
screening as “a way to add a little cash to their retirement funds”). Similar attitudes were
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have framed plaintiffs’ reluctance to sue in these matters as a product of rational
claiming decisions,88 as their individual costs of litigation will exceed the expected
gains, many of these potential plaintiffs should not reach the claiming stage in the
first place. Even if small or as yet unrealized injuries are acknowledged, they may
not evoke a sufficient reaction to warrant more attention than the numerous
annoyances and slights people confront every day.
This disconnect is significant because the transformation of the plaintiff’s
perspective not only plays a significant role in determining whether she will sue but
also how committed she will be to doing so. The degree to which a victim perceives
the defendant’s conduct as wrongful influences her commitment to holding the
defendant accountable throughout the litigation and settlement process, even where
legal liability is not dependent upon fault.89 Likewise, a plaintiff’s perception of the
breadth and depth of the harm caused by the defendant plays a significant role in
shaping her commitment to demanding accountability through litigation rather than
settlement.90 In sum, plaintiffs within a claim pool may be distinguishable not only
on the basis of objective criteria but also by the degree to which they have
internalized their injuries and attributed them to the wrongdoing of another.
In some cases, the stark difference between claiming rates in traditional and
aggregate litigation91 is not merely a product of increased publicity; it reflects the
obvious distinction between those who have sufficient commitment to sue
notwithstanding the obstacles and those who agree to sell litigation rights they may
not value or perceive to be worth the trouble of litigation. Indeed, there is little
reason to believe that the practices used in these cases generate large volumes of
traditional, high-commitment plaintiffs. Thirty-second commercials and internet
advertising do little more than advise that lawyers are looking for clients, and studies
show that mass tort plaintiffs only rarely have direct contact with their lawyers,92
observed among some plaintiffs in the fen-phen case. Andrew Wolfson, Woman Claims
Lawyers Exaggerated Diet-Drug Injuries, COURIER-J., June 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing
former paralegal’s testimony that clients were happy with echocardiogram readings that
allegedly exaggerated their injuries “because it meant they were going to get more money”).
88
See, e.g., Campos, supra note 5; David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What
Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 397-400 (2000); Robert G.
Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529 (1997).
89
See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution:
How No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (1997) (discussing the
significance of assigning fault to the claiming decision and finding that no-fault claimants’
primary motivation was to obtain compensation, while those who pursued tort litigation were
motivated by the desire to hold the wrongdoer accountable or to obtain information about the
circumstances of the injury).
90
See generally Gillian Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse:
Experiences With the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).
91

McGovern, supra note 16, at 688 (“Unlike most torts where not every individual
harmed seeks legal redress, mature mass torts generate an overabundance of plaintiffs through
widespread publicity, including a substantial number of false positive claims.”).
92
Cramton, supra note 77, at 1919-93 (discussing client communication in mass tort); see
also Weinstein, supra note 7, at 496-98 (discussing shortcomings of client communication
where lawyers represent “hundreds or thousands of clients”).
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much less receive sufficient counsel to overcome the numerous barriers to naming
and blaming that have been identified.93 To the contrary, even if these
advertisements may be viewed as reflecting potential compensability in litigation or
settlement, poor public opinion of the ethics of lawyers who engage in dragnet
recruiting and the manipulability of the legal system94 suggests that even those who
sign up may not accept that they are injured or have been wronged by the defendant.
And the fact that so many mass tort claimants appear to have low claiming
commitment levels once they are signed suggests that the surge in new claims is not
the product of increased naming and blaming.95
On the other hand, aggregation and the methods used to build claim portfolios
appear extremely effective at amassing passive claims. Representing a large group
of plaintiffs may provide the firm some advantage in obtaining a leadership role, but
individual lawyers can still benefit from submitting the claims they control to any
resulting global settlement regardless of their role in the case.96 Assuming they are
at least prepared to do what is necessary to satisfy the pre-trial and settlement criteria
established in the case,97 obligations that will be less demanding than preparing each
claim for trial,98 there may be little practical downside to building a sizeable claim
portfolio, particularly for those with reasonable prospects of obtaining an
appointment to the steering committee or some other lucrative role in the case. To
the extent medical diagnoses are required, law firms tend to select the doctors,
arrange the appointments and pay the doctors directly.99 And a plaintiff does not
need a sufficient commitment to be actively involved in the case because only a few,
if any, will be called on to litigate their claims fully.
In so dramatically reducing the barriers to claiming, even those who have not
named and blamed may find joining a claim pool worth the time and effort. At the
extreme, mass tort practice can transform some plaintiffs’ perceptions to the point
that the process no longer resembles litigation at all. As one asbestos plaintiff noted,
“It’s better than the lottery. If they find something, I get a few thousand dollars I
didn’t have. If they don’t find anything, I’ve just lost an afternoon.”100
When the claim pool is flooded with passive claimants, any vote or collective
settlement acceptance of the claim pool is far more likely to reflect passive plaintiffs’
loss aversion than a rational assessment of the settlement by those who might be
likely to sue otherwise. “[L]itigants, like decision-makers generally, evaluate
93

See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Faten Sabry, The Propensity to Sue: Why do People
Seek Legal Actions?, 42 BUS. ECON. 31, 31 (2007) (discussing numerous personal and social
barriers to naming, blaming and claiming).
94

See Rhode, supra note 86, at 448.

95

See Brown, supra note 19, at 582-83 (2012) (discussing tendency of asbestos and silica
claimants to withdraw claims when asked to submit modest additional documentation).
96

See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 53, at 16-18.

97

See Brown, supra note 19, at 612-17.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 585.

100

Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 8,
2003, at A1.
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decision options relative to the current state of affairs and make risk-averse decisions
when choosing between gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing between
losses.”101 Those who internalize the reality of their injuries and the defendant’s
fault begin litigation with this reality framing their expectations.102 For these
plaintiffs, any settlement proposal that is below expectations represents a loss to be
avoided rather than a gain, while passive claimants who initially perceive any
settlement as a windfall may see its potential rejection of the same settlement as a
loss.103 The manner in which aggregate litigation sweeps in plaintiffs lends itself to
creating claim pools that are not only more passive but also more risk-averse than
traditional plaintiffs, so a facially democratic vote of the pool provides little
assurance that the settlement reflects fair compensation for those who believe they
have suffered a loss at the hands of the defendant.104
In bankruptcy or other mandatory aggregation, dissatisfied plaintiffs’ only
practical opportunity for voice—voting on any proposed plan—will be overwhelmed
by the sheer volume of votes controlled by the lead firms.105 When global
settlements are not mandatory, the effect can nonetheless be comparable. The
appearance of support from an overwhelming number of other plaintiffs may
reinforce the prevailing vision of those who wish to pursue individual litigation as
extortionists or self-indulgent holdouts. Plaintiffs who might be inclined to pursue
individual litigation standing alone will face considerable judicial and social pressure
to conform to the preferences of the majority,106 and this pressure will be
compounded by the presence of take it or leave it settlement terms, limited
information concerning the settlement and their risks at trial, and aggressive efforts
by lead counsel to sell the settlement to the claim pool.
4. Constraining Opt-Out Options
As demonstrated in the Vioxx matter, the power to shape settlement terms—
including the power to delay or limit the power to opt-out or exit—is perhaps the
101
See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 163, 167-68 (2000).
102
See John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81, 99 (2001) (“[M]any plaintiffs may initially be risk-seeking
because they may have framed the case as a loss and therefore be more willing to go through
the difficult process of finding and consulting a lawyer.”).
103

See id. at 98 (“Thus, many plaintiffs might be initially risk-seeking because plaintiffs
will frame their situation as a loss. They have already suffered some ‘damage.’ Unless they
file a lawsuit, they face the certainty of never recovering anything for that loss.”). Although
some have suggested that frivolous plaintiffs are also risk seeking. See Guthrie, supra note
101 (assuming a traditional litigation framework where these actors have decided to claim
notwithstanding the low probability of success). As noted previously, however, mass
aggregation promotes passive claiming regardless of the individual claimants’ litigation risk
preference.
104
See DiPippa, supra note 102, at 98-99 (discussing how the barriers to claiming in
traditional litigation weeds out risk-averse plaintiffs).
105

See S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the
Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841, 858-60 (2008).
106

See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 90, at 667; Burch, supra note 7, at 90-91.
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most obvious and direct manner in which lead counsel can coerce plaintiffs. As the
late Richard Nagareda noted in the class action context, the “settlement might try to
make an offer that class members cannot refuse in the more sinister sense used in
The Godfather: an offer that is no offer at all in practical terms but, rather, simply an
illegitimate threat to leave class members with nothing in the event that they refuse
the offer.”107 In the Vioxx settlement, such an “offer they can’t refuse” involved
stripping plaintiffs who opted out of their counsel of choice. In the Sulzer hip
implant settlement, the designers used “a wily combination of a security interest and
a trust fund to leave practically nothing from which opt-out claimants might
recover.”108
Moreover, even without express settlement terms that directly limit opt-out
options, the inability to advance individual cases during the several months or longer
that it may take to approve proposed settlements may also leave plaintiffs with little
choice but to accept the global settlement or individual settlement of excluded
claims. Indeed, the Deepwater Horizon MDL settlements were conditioned on the
stay of phase I bellwether trials and contemplated that related matters would not
proceed pending consideration of the settlement.109 Such an exercise of power may
have largely the same effect as a defendant’s scorched-earth litigation strategy; if
justice delayed is justice denied, it makes little difference if the delay is caused by a
recalcitrant tortfeasor or lead counsel whose MDL agenda forces the disempowered
plaintiff to the backburner.
5. Political Considerations
The attenuated relationships between attorneys and clients create significant
obstacles to effective plaintiff monitoring, both of their individual lawyers and lead
counsel. Section 1407 does not address lead attorneys’ duties to MDL plaintiffs who
are not their own clients, and the case law provides little guidance.110 Although they
are clearly fiduciaries with respect to clients within their claim portfolios, “there is
no evidence that lead attorneys look to their clients for instructions when deciding
how to handle MDLs.”111 They do not consult with clients concerning which cases
to advance as bellwethers or seek authority to negotiate settlement terms with the
defendant. Nor is there any evidence that they gauge the claim pool’s or their own
client portfolio’s support for foregoing bellwether trials before agreeing to the terms
of early global settlements, even in matters where the litigation may advance
plaintiffs’ and the affected community’s other non-pecuniary interests.
Most accounts of attorney-client conflict in aggregate litigation focus on the
attorney’s financial interests in the immediate case, but the lawyers who ultimately
107

Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damages Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to
Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 144 (2003).
108

Id.

109

See Plaintiffs’ & BP’s Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Proposed Med. Benefits Class Action Settlement, Approval of Class Notice, &
Related Matters at 39-40, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mexico, No. MDL 2179, ECF No. 6267, at 39-40 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2012).
110

Silver, supra note 38, at 1988.

111

Id. at 1986.
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make the critical decisions in these cases are most often part of a relatively small
group of repeat players in mass tort litigation. This generates a conflict between the
lawyer’s need to maintain or advance her position within the repeat player
community and the duty to represent the best interests of at least some of her own
clients. If those interests are not shared, a lawyer who is faithful to her clients’
interests may be sanctioned by her peers not only in the instant case but also with
respect to future appointments and common benefit fund distributions.112
Conversely, disempowered lawyers with sufficient claim portfolios to block
settlement may have strong incentives to challenge the settlement to discourage
similar disempowerment in future cases. Either scenario raises the prospect that the
lawyer’s decisions will conflict with the interests of at least some of her clients.
Ultimately, however, repeat player politics can be addressed without
undermining cohesion. Those lawyers who have both sufficient client pools to
interfere with any global settlement and a history of doing so are easily identified
and may be brought into the fold through common benefit work assignments and
modifications to distributions from the common benefit fund.113 Conversely, lead
counsel may propose or otherwise go along with defendant proposals that impose
additional burdens on disempowered holdout lawyers.114
D. The Limited Checks on Domination
1. Plaintiff Oversight and Referrals
Lead attorneys in multidistrict litigation are, in a very real sense, beyond the
control of any plaintiffs, even those within their own claim portfolios. Mass tort
clients frequently do not have direct relationships and regular personal
communication with the counsel they hired,115 much less the attorneys to whom their
cases are referred for litigation. It is simply not possible for lawyers to counsel and
take direct and personal instruction from clients when one lawyer represents several
thousand individuals in one matter.116 Much of the work of litigation occurs out of
112

See, e.g., Lachance v. Harrington, 965 F. Supp. 630, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[T]he
incentives among plaintiff lawyers in the class action bar to maintain ties with their fellows in
order to have a role in the next ‘big case’ cannot be overlooked.”); see also Transcript of
Initial Pretrial Conference, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07md-01871-CMR, ECF No. 111, at 43-44 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2008) (leading MDL plaintiffs’
lawyer Daniel Becnel discussing lead counsel patronage appointments for common interest
work in other multi-district litigation).
113

See infra Part IV.A.2.

114

This may include, for example, requiring lawyers who oppose a proposed settlement to
submit additional claim information or otherwise incur substantial additional costs. See
Brown, supra note 19, at 616 (discussing law firms’ contentions along these lines in the
Bextra and Celebrex MDL proceedings); see also Silver & Miller, supra note 40.
115
Weinstein, supra note 7, at 494 (“Many of these lawyers do not maintain meaningful
one-to-one contact with their clients, nor can they represent these people as individuals, each
with his or her own needs and desires. The client becomes no more than an unembodied
cause of action.”).
116
In the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation, for example, the judge concluded that
the Napoli law firm was too conflicted to advise its clients on the details of the settlement. In
re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp.2d 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The
[settlement agreement] was a long and complicated document of 104 pages and 20 exhibits
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court and out of public view, meaning that the only party with both a duty to the
client and sufficient knowledge of an attorney’s disloyalty will be the attorney. On
top of these difficulties in monitoring their own counsel, individual plaintiffs do not
even have the power to oversee and demand loyalty from most, if any, of the
numerous lawyers who staff leadership committees or perform common interest
work within an MDL.117
In addition, the repeat player effect may shift a critical check on disloyalty to
clients—the belief that those who act against the interests of their clients will not
obtain client referrals in the future—to a need to establish or reinforce the lawyer’s
reputation within the repeat player community. And the risk of such a is heightened
where clients may be readily available without former client referrals, clients are
unlikely to become aware of any disloyalty, and the perception of being a strong
player in mass tort litigation may be a valuable tool in mass media and internet client
advertising.
2. Judicial Oversight
To protect the interests of litigants, MDL judges increasingly hold hearings to
consider the fairness and adequacy of any global settlement, but it is severely limited
in this context. The hearing, of course, comes only after the deal is fully negotiated
and difficult to rework and suffers from the same limitations found in class action
fairness hearings.118 Even if there were reasonably objective criteria for accurately
assessing the fairness of a given settlement,119 settlement proponents shape the
judge’s knowledge of the relevant issues and, at this stage, have a shared interest in
ensuring that the information advanced is uniformly favorable.120 Indeed, it is not at
all clear that ostensible fairness hearings involve “any independent review of the
fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the terms of the settlement or the process

containing approximately an additional 130 pages. Normally, lawyers advise clients as to the
meaning and consequences of a complicated document and are in turn authorized and
instructed by their clients how to act on their behalves. However, this model did not fit the
mass tort litigation before me, with 9,000 Plaintiffs represented by a single law firm and
numerous potential conflicts among them and between them and their law firm.”).
117

Accord Pope v. Rice, No. 04 Civ. 4171(DLC) 2005 WL 613085 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,
2005).
118
See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1993) (discussing the limits of judicial oversight in class actions).
119
See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1444-45 (2006) (noting scholarship supporting the view
that “there are simply no objective criteria by which the judges can accurately assess either the
value or the process of settlements.”); G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering Into a Black Box:
Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1271, 1279 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lecture, The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1995).
120

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) ("Settlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel.").
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that led to the agreement.”121 Finally, given the structural limitations of section 1407,
the court’s authority to reject non-class settlements that are unfavorable to plaintiffs
is limited.122
Even where lawyers engage in dubious recruiting and settlement practices,
judicial oversight is further limited by the dynamics of aggregate litigation. MDL
judges are not dependent on lawyers to bring high-profile cases to them as in other
forms of aggregation,123 but they do depend on the extensive work that lawyers
perform to make the cases run smoothly.124 Lawyers not only fund the plaintiffs’
side of the litigation but also control the networks that draw potential plaintiffs into
the process, perform the work necessary to advance the case, and bring the claim
pool together in settlement. While judges have an interest in clearing these complex
matters from their dockets—an interest reinforced by the emphasis on maximizing
efficiency and prompt resolution in multidistrict litigation generally125—they also
have an interest in protecting the integrity of the process. Judges may take action
where the misconduct is overt and their conduct is an obvious and direct violation of
ethical rules or applicable law, but few of the distortions of the process identified fall
neatly into these categories.
Under the circumstances, the reluctance to take firm action against repeat players
where the line between unethical conduct and aggressive representation is uncertain
may be more a sign of appropriate judicial temperament than indifference. We
expect judges to act on established facts, not inferences and suspicions about the
parties before them. In aggregate litigation, where lawyers play such a central role,
aggressive responses to perceived but uncertain misconduct can have a severe impact
on the proceedings and the innocent plaintiffs whose interests are at stake. This
dynamic suggests an answer to the question of why so few lawyers involved in the
client recruiting and other mass tort scandals of the last decade have been

121

Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 802
(2010) (discussing the Vioxx settlement hearing and contrasting the limited review in that case
and the Zyprexa case with a far more searching inquiring into these matters in Agent Orange).
122

See, e.g., Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial
“Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319
(2011) (questioning judicial authority to approve or reject private settlements in multidistrict
litigation); Willging & Lee, supra note 121, at 801 (“Neither the MDL statute nor the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure include any requirement that the court review a consolidated
settlement, even an opt-in settlement negotiated by attorneys in the proceeding. The
presumption is that the attorneys for the individual plaintiffs will represent the plaintiffs'
interests adequately.”).
123

See generally LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (discussing the dependency corruption that arises
as a result of bankruptcy forum shopping).
124

The JPML guide for MDL judges advises judges, “You cannot manage an MDL entirely
yourself. To a large extent, you must rely upon lead counsel to assist you.” MDL GUIDE,
supra note 28, at 3.
125
See, e.g., Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of
Expediency, 1997 BYU L. REV. 821, 832 (1997) (noting the extreme emphasis on judicial
efficiency in multidistrict litigation).
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sanctioned.126 And when judges have taken a more aggressive line, they have met
with resistance and outrage from litigants, experts and the public.127
IV. THE PROBLEM OF REPEAT PLAYER DOMINATION
Any first-year law student will be familiar with some of the basic functions and
goals of tort law: compensation; deterrence; fairness; and administrative efficiency.
And across these considerations, aggregative proceedings promise distinct
advantages over individual litigation in mass harm matters. Aggregation levels the
playing field with defendants, who have intrinsic economic and other advantages in
mass harm cases over any individual plaintiff, which, in turn, should promote
compensation and deterrence. A level playing field should better promote fairness—
allowing plaintiffs and defendants to obtain judgments or settlements based on merit
rather than forcing outgunned and underfinanced plaintiffs to accept lowball
settlement offers.
As often becomes clear in first-year Torts and in practice, these goals “may
actually often be in conflict with one another in application to real world events.”128
One or more of the dimensions of deterring wrongful behavior—through subjecting
the misconduct to public scrutiny, increasing the aggregate risk of liability, or
otherwise—may conflict with plaintiffs’ individual or collective interests in
compensation. Efforts to make the process procedurally fair and transparent may be
manipulated by a party to increase the costs of the process beyond the point that her
adversary can rationally afford to continue with the litigation. Conversely,
procedures that are incredibly efficient may obtain this efficiency by cutting corners
and relying on unjustified presumptions. Trial by ordeal, for example, was far more
efficient than modern civil litigation, yet nobody seriously suggests that a return to
such a model of dispute resolution is desirable.
At settlement, these questions may be viewed in the narrow terms of whether the
proposed settlement effectively balances the objectives of substantive law. In other
words, what ends are advanced by the settlement, and who decides? Structurally,
section 1407 does not contemplate, much less expressly authorize, placing this
decision in the hands of anyone other than the holders of the substantive rights at
issue.129 As demonstrated in the preceding part, however, these questions are
126

Brown, supra note 19, at 610.

127

For example, in the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation, Judge Hellerstein’s
efforts to ensure the fairness of the proposed settlement drew considerable condemnation from
editorial boards, litigants and several scholars. See, e.g., Editorial, Remember the Blindfold,
Judge, N.Y. POST, Apr. 14, 2010, at 30 (criticizing Judge Hellerstein’s efforts to be more
involved in shaping the settlement and characterizing his complaints (“I don’t know what’s
going on [with the settlement]”) as “a temper tantrum of sorts”); John Riley, Judge
Challenged on Ruling, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 15, 2010, at A6 (noting various attacks on
Judge Hellerstein’s initial stance on the World Trade Center settlement); see also Grabill,
supra note 48, at 146-53 (criticizing judicial review of MDL settlements generally and Judge
Hellerstein’s approach in the World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation specifically).
128

DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (3d ed. 2006).

129

As Martin Redish noted in his critique of the class action device, “the class action was
never designed as a freestanding legal device for the purpose of ‘doing justice,’ nor is it a
mechanism intended to serve as a roving policeman of corporate misdeeds or as a mechanism
by which to redistribute wealth.” MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE 22 (2009).
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ultimately left to the repeat players who control multidistrict proceedings. Thus, this
section focuses on the degree to which repeat players reflect plaintiffs’ interests in
the proceedings, whether those repeat players who assume lead counsel roles are
likely to be the best suited for striking this balance, and the impact of modern mass
tort practice on the perceived legitimacy of the process.
A. Domination, Conflicts, and Competition
If we assume that lead attorneys’ interests are aligned with plaintiffs’ interests,
the fact that lead counsel set the agenda for the MDL—and, accordingly, define the
common good to be pursued—should be of little concern. Empowering these repeat
players should level the playing field with defendants prior to settlement and provide
sufficient cohesion across the claim pool to preclude plaintiff self-interest from
undermining any settlement that is achieved. In sum, empowering repeat players
may be viewed as best ensuring that the purpose of applicable substantive law is
achieved in settlement.
Collectively, however, the layers of representation, referral and control are so
complex that conflicts of interest may be inevitable. As demonstrated, the modern
framework sweeps a plaintiff into one firm’s portfolio, in which her interests may
conflict with both the lawyer’s personal interests and the interests of others within
that portfolio. If this lawyer refers the cases to another attorney with more influence,
similar conflicts with the second lawyer’s personal and portfolio majority’s interests
may also be present. When that lawyer is not among those controlling the direction
of the case, there are yet more opportunities for personal and client majority/minority
conflicts. And, by this point, the plaintiff is so far removed from those making the
critical decisions that will drive the case toward conclusion that her individual
preferences will be of little concern to those making the decisions that drive the
inexorable march toward global settlement.
1. The Failure of the Common Good Emphasis
The disconnect between the interests of lead counsel and plaintiffs places a
thumb on the scale in favor of prompt global settlement ahead of plaintiffs’ other
interests in discovery and trial. Of course, as others have noted previously, the
lawyers who have invested considerable resources in the litigation may prefer to
accept an early settlement that provides sufficient returns for her investment even if
it fails to capture the full value of her clients’ claims.130 This risk can be particularly
high where attorneys invest enormous sums in the litigation over a period of years.131
Moreover, even where the plaintiffs’ non-pecuniary objectives—getting answers,
Similarly, nothing in section 1407 alters the fact that it, like the class action, “is nothing more
than an elaborate procedural device designed to facilitate the enforcement of pre-existing
substantive law” that is vested in plaintiffs rather than repeat players. Id.
130

Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 977-78 (1995).
131

See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196-98 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (discussing financial stress on one of the law firms in the case and concluding, “[t]he
prospect of settlement and a fee of $250 million gave the firm an interest that may not have
been in line with many of its clients' interests”); In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.,
769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing similar incentives generating a conflict
for the only other law firm representing a large group of plaintiffs in the case).
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holding those responsible accountable publicly for their actions, and shaping public
and political discussion to avoid similar problems in the future—may be achieved
through litigation, the power to shape the agenda toward prompt settlement may
foreclose these options as a condition of settlement.
With respect to compensation, even if the lawyer or lawyers who control the
process share the interests of the claim pool with respect to increasing the size of the
settlement, their own recoveries will also be dependent on how the fund is divided.
Higher evidentiary barriers will increase the firms’ overhead and reduce the number
of the claims they control that are ultimately compensable, even if these barriers
more effectively distinguish good and bad claims. Lead firms may also have an
interest in maximizing claimant approval or acceptance through coercion132 rather
than accommodating minority claimants’ needs and interests that may reduce their
own claim portfolio’s recovery. Collectively, these considerations demonstrate that
lead counsels’ interests advancing the settlement are likely to be at odds with at least
some of the plaintiffs within the claim pool.133
Likewise, the belief that deterrence is improved by prompt global settlement is
largely premised upon untested assumptions about the manner and degree to which
different aspects of tort litigation may alter corporate behavior. From a social
welfare standpoint, even if we assume that the quasi-class action increases aggregate
liability, it is far from clear that this effect improves deterrence.134 The murky
parameters of this broader debate on the relationship between raw liability and
deterrence are beyond the scope of this paper, but the dearth of empirical support for
tort liability-centered deterrence should, at a minimum, suggest caution in framing
aggregate litigation policy solely on accelerating and increasing aggregate settlement
liability.
This need for caution is further warranted by the potential for the settlementfocused framework to cap defendants’ other perceived risks of civil litigation. When
plaintiffs express concern that defendants are merely writing checks to sweep their
problems under the rug,135 they capture the range of risks to the defendant more
accurately than a model focused solely on the raw financial costs that litigation and
settlement entail. The risks to decision makers and the enterprise alike may be more
complex than the diversion of resources decision makers do not own.136 In criminal
132

See infra Part III.B.

133

Accord Brown, supra note 105, at 907-09 (discussing the frequency of this form of
conflict of interest in asbestos bankruptcies).
134

See generally Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, The Uneasy Case for Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010).
135

See Rebecca Mowbray, BP Oil Spill Health Settlement Details are Still a Mystery, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 11, 2012 (noting plaintiff’s concerns that settlement might
mean their stories would be “swept under the rug”); Harry R. Weber & Michael Kunzelman,
BP, Plaintiffs Focus on Gulf Oil Spill Settlement, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 27, 2012 (quoting
plaintiff’s concerns that the Deepwater Horizon MDL settlements would allow BP to simply
“write a check to solve their problems”).
136

Kara Scharwath, BP Cuts a Deal on the Deepwater Horizon Spill, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Mar.
6, 2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/03/bp-cuts-deal-deepwater-horizon-spill/ (“For a
company that is trying to move on from a disaster of such grand proportions, the decision to
settle was a smart one. It puts the money in the hands of the plaintiffs much more quickly
than if the company were to have gone to trial, which certainly helps their perception of the
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law, for example, it is recognized that fear of the reputational costs of a conviction
may far exceed the threat of substantial monetary penalties in civil litigation,137 yet
the reputational effects that may arise from harmful disclosures in civil litigation
tend to be discounted in the direct economic liability analysis.
For much the same reason companies fear criminal actions, defendants are
frequently willing to pay more to settle a case where harmful discovery can be
shielded from public scrutiny.138 When a company is buying peace in global
settlement, they are buying not only a cap on litigation costs and liability but also on
public attention to potentially ruinous revelations about the company’s wrongdoing.
This may allow counsel to increase the aggregate settlement amount by some portion
of the monetary value of secrecy to the defendant,139 but it also allows defendants to
avoid potentially catastrophic public relations fallout and constant public reminders
of the harm they have caused.140 In the process, an early settlement may unduly limit
policy discussions concerning the specific events and processes that gave rise to the
injurious event. In this respect, the degree to which early mass settlement transforms
civil litigation into a complex business transaction can have a perverse effect on
deterrence.
The precise effect of negative publicity on deterrence is difficult to quantify, and
the degree to which early settlement may undermine this effect will vary from case
to case. Discussions of this form of deterrence are grounded more in speculation and
anecdotes than empirical evidence. Moreover, it is difficult to say how much, if any,
company. And by avoiding a lengthy, dramatic trial, BP can protect it’s image and keep
damaging headlines off the front page.”).
137

See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 271, 280 (2008) ("The perception that the reputational consequences of a conviction
could exceed even the substantial monetary penalties in any parallel civil litigation can explain
why firms under investigation for criminal violations are willing to do almost whatever it
takes--including waiving attorney-client privilege, assisting the government's prosecution of
their senior officers, and paying millions of dollars in civil fines—to avoid an indictment.").
138

William G. Childs, When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective
Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 565, 571 and n.17 (2008) (“[T]he possibility of
keeping documents secret—both ‘bad documents’ and marginally confidential but valuable
documents—no doubt can affect the ability of plaintiffs to settle cases and the amount for
which cases will settle. Put more bluntly, defendants will pay more to keep bad documents
secret.”).
139

Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV.
979, 981-82 (2010).
140

As Shavell and Polinsky acknowledge, manufacturers are clearly motivated to avoid
declines in product sales that would result from the perception that their products cause injury.
Shavell & Polinsky, supra note 134, at 1439; see also Deborah A. Lilienthal, Litigation Public
Relations: The Provisional Remedy of the Communications World, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
895, 897-98 (1999-2000) (“Many defendants recognize that they must be concerned with
opinion outside the courtroom as well as inside. In fact, negative public opinion may impact a
company more than an adverse legal decision. After all, if a company cannot pay its
judgment, it can seek bankruptcy protection. If, on the other hand, the public believes your
product is unsafe, that you are dishonest, that your business practices are unjust, no code, case
law or judge can protect your client's market share, brand name, reputation, or credibility in
the court of public opinion.”).
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tort litigation adds to this form of deterrence when the injurious events at issue are
already in the public eye due to extensive public and media interest. And given that
so many traditional civil litigation cases settle as well, it may be that aggregation
does no more than preserve a defendant’s expectation of controlling the public
relations fallout in tort litigation. This is not to say the effect plays a marginal role in
deterring undesirable conduct ex ante; it merely reflects the difficulty in identifying
what truly drives decision makers to modify their behavior and the extent to which
aggregation merely suffers from the same shortcomings of traditional civil litigation.
2. Repeat Player Expertise and Plaintiffs’ Interests
The “political convention mentality that currently prevails in MDLs”141 can
generate conflicts with the interests of the claim pool. Even if we assume that
politically-motivated appointments and assignments are valuable inasmuch as they
may promote cooperation among counsel and discourage strategic dissent by firms
controlling large claim portfolios, the use of such assignments as a means of
fostering loyalty to the collective interests of the leadership may come at the expense
of zealous representation of the attorney’s clients’ interests.142 At the same time, the
danger in political appointments is that lawyers who may be better suited to specific
roles due to experience, quality of work, ability to contain costs or otherwise are
passed over to accommodate lawyers who are simply better politicians or have more
effective networks for amassing large claim portfolios.143
In the Vioxx case, for example, the Motley Rice firm argued that the bellwether
cases it prepared for trial were “pushed aside” by influential counsel in favor of their
own cases.144 In response, the Fee Allocation Committee argued that it was “familiar
with the Motley Rice firm, the quality of their work and the efficiency of their
lawyers” and accused the firm of overbilling.145 Following the special master’s
141
Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2002 (2011).
142

See supra Part III.A.1.

143

Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1623-25 (2008) (discussing the risk that the post-Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)
class actions and non-class aggregation will favor “dominant players on the plaintiff’s side”
and the role of networks and “connections” in obtaining appointments).
144

Motley Rice's Objection to the Vioxx Fee Allocation Comm.'s Common Benefit Fee
Recommendation, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 7 (E.D. La. Feb. 7,
2011). As Charles Silver noted:
In other words, Motley Rice contends that, when selecting Vioxx cases for bellwether
trials, the lead attorneys were more concerned about fattening their lodestars than
maximizing the value of plaintiffs' claims. I do not know whether this is true, but I
can say that the allegation is plausible because the lodestar method, which rewards
time expended, creates perverse incentives. . . . Motley Rice's complaint is plausible
because judges base common benefit fee awards in MDLs on time expended and
hourly rates.
Silver, supra note 141, at 2002.
145

Indeed, in response, the committee criticized Motley Rice’s work on the matter. Fee
Allocation Comm.’s Response to Objections to Recommended Common Benefit Fee
Allocation, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 13 (Mar. 4, 2011) (“The Fee
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hearing on the matter, the Fee Allocation Committee increased the size of Motley
Rice’s proposed allocation from $195,000 to $1,250,000, which was approved by the
special master and the court.146
Although Motley Rice’s perception of the reasons for the strategic decision to
litigate other cases ahead of its own may not be entitled to deference, it is easy to see
how these decisions can be tainted by the lead firms’ own self-interest. At the same
time, if the lead lawyers are indeed familiar with Motley Rice and have such a
negative view of their work and efficiency, the decision to have them do any work at
all—much less increase their compensation by more than one million dollars—is
perplexing. Regardless of how one evaluates the arguments advanced by the lawyers
in the heat of a bitter fee dispute, it reinforces that the manner in which lead firms
assign, manage and oversee the compensation for other lawyers involved in common
benefit work can be tainted by political considerations that are not consistent with
the best interests of the claim pool or the lawyers whose fees will be taxed to
compensate others for that work.
To be clear, although quid pro quo understandings and agreements among repeat
players may arise from time to time, the same effect can be observed even in the
absence of such an express understanding. Where lawyers play an active role in
selecting other lawyers to serve on the steering committee or perform other common
interest work, these decisions may be framed by the participants’ desires to build
loyalty and relationships across cases. Although courts have acknowledged some of
these concerns and taken a more active role in selecting counsel for leadership
roles,147 they nonetheless look to the firms’ respective influence within the mass tort
bar when making key appointments.148 To that end, a firm’s skillful leveraging of its
position in a case may be seen as essential to build the support and influence
necessary to obtain desirable positions in future cases.149
In sum, the perceived need to ensure cohesion among the members of the mass
tort bar within a case tends to reward political savvy over legal skill, diligent

Allocation Committee is familiar with the Motley Rice firm, the quality of their work and the
efficiency of their lawyers. Therefore, the Committee concluded that these time records were
likely reconstructed and reflected an overestimate of the time actually worked.”).
146
See Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 1657, at 108 (E.D. La.
Aug. 9, 2011).
147

Order & Reasons, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, at 3, n.4 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 2010) (“[T]he selection of lead counsel by their fellow attorneys would involve
intrigue and side agreements which would make Macbeth appear to be a juvenile manipulator.
Frequently, recommendations by attorneys for positions on leadership committees are
governed more on friendship, past commitments and future hopes than on current issues.”).
148
Id. (noting that “the efficient and successful resolution of an MDL is dependent on
coordination and cooperation of lead counsel for all sides” and requires lawyers who have
demonstrated sufficient “diplomatic skills to coordinate the efforts of a diverse group”).
149

Accord Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts—Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228,
1232 (1995) (discussing the need to “parlay the small favors and back scratching of a series of
class-action cases into a position of influence and sizable fees in a future class action of one's
own”). Although Wolfram discussed this back scratching in the class action context, this
gamesmanship is equally critical in modern MDL practice given the current approach to
selecting firms for leadership and other roles.
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assessment of plaintiffs’ preferences and objectives in litigation and settlement, and
restraint in amassing and awarding common benefit funds. This does not mean that
those who obtain leadership positions or common benefit work necessarily lack
sufficient competence to perform their work effectively, but it does caution against
blind confidence that the choices made by lead counsel will reflect plaintiffs’
individual or collective best interests.
3. Competition and Distortion of the Mass Tort
As noted in Part II.A., the competition that underlies modern mass tort recruiting
fuels the rapid growth of the modern mass tort following a triggering event. Within
five months of the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, BP had been
named in an estimated three hundred civil lawsuits across the country involving tens
of thousands of plaintiffs, with many consolidated in a federal MDL.150 Likewise,
within a few months after a widely publicized “unintended acceleration” accident
killed four people and caused Toyota to recall 3.8 million vehicles, more than one
hundred lawsuits against the company were filed and consolidated in another federal
MDL.151 In a far less publicized matter, competing firms had already recruited
several hundred clients and moved for the creation of an MDL less than one month
after DePuy’s recall of two hip replacement products and public commitment to
cover all of the costs associated with the recall in August 2010.152 In sum, whatever
role maturity may still play in some cases, other events are more likely to trigger
mass client solicitation today.
How do we account for such a shift? Representing a large group of plaintiffs
may provide the firm some advantage in obtaining a leadership role,153 and those
who do not obtain such appointments may nonetheless leverage their portfolios to
demand additional concessions for themselves or their clients. At this stage, it is
sufficient to identify those who fit the basic profile and add their potential claims to
the portfolio;154 which not only provides the lawyer with practical control over the
claim but also prevents competitors from obtaining them and precludes defendants

150

See John Schwarz, U.S. Judge in New Orleans Will Hear Gulf Spill Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, at A11.
151
See Transfer & Order, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing,
Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2151 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (ordering
consolidation of eleven class actions and more than one hundred other personal injury and
economic loss lawsuits pending against Toyota arising out of alleged “unintended
acceleration”).
152

DePuy issued a recall of its ASR hip replacement devices on August 24, 2010. In
re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358,
MDL No. 2244 (J.P.M.L. May 24, 2011). Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a motion to consolidate
litigation concerning the devices on September 3, 2010, and the JPML ordered consolidation
in the Northern District of Ohio on December 7, 2010. See Transfer Order, In re DePuy
Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2197 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 3,
2010).
153

See, e.g., NAGAREDA, , supra note 53, at 16-18; see also McCollam, supra note 31.

154

Brown, supra note 19, at 593-95.
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from settling with them prematurely.155 Assuming they are at least prepared to do
what is necessary to satisfy the pre-trial and settlement criteria established in the
case,156 obligations that will be less demanding than preparing each claim for trial,157
there may be little practical downside to building a sizeable claim portfolio.
Under the accelerated aggregation and settlement model, the aggressive
recruiting practices that have plagued some mature mass torts come at the beginning
of the case. In the Deepwater Horizon MDL, for example, several victims who
attempted to submit claims to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility were surprised to
discover that they had ostensibly agreed to representation by counsel.158 Likewise,
after the threatened demise of asbestos litigation triggered a rush to file silicosis
claims, thousands of asbestos plaintiffs were “recycled” as silicosis plaintiffs.159
Similarly dubious recruiting and development practices have been identified in the
other cases.160
Defense lawyers, who also tend to be frequent repeat players in these cases, are
well aware of the degree to which plaintiffs’ lawyers may recruit and litigate claims
in ways that conflict with broader norms. The transformation from civil litigation
from a battle between the weak and powerful to aggregate litigation among largely
equal—and equally imperfect—institutional repeat players provides opportunities for
defendants even as it may level the playing field in court. To that end, defense
firms’ client development materials tend to highlight not only their legal skill but
also their experience in identifying and exploiting these conflicts161 for good reason:
emphasizing the corruption of the plaintiffs’ bar may shift prospective juror and
broader public attention away from the defendant’s own actions in ways that
advance their clients’ interests.
Combined with the defense narratives concerning the impact of frivolous
litigation on job creation, retirement security and global competition; it is easy to see
how defendants have been successful in altering public opinion in some mass tort
155

Once a party is represented by counsel, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
precludes opposing counsel from communicating about the matter with the client without
consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2012) (Opposing counsel “shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”). Judge Weinstein noted this
limitation as an issue in the Dalkon Shield case and other evidence of this rule undermining
client access to information. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 496-97.
156

Brown, supra note 19, at 612-17.

157

Id.

158

McCollam, supra note 31 (interviewing numerous victims who were misled into signing
retention agreements or claimed they never retained anyone as counsel).
159

Brown, supra note 19, at 581.

160

Id. at 583-86.

161
See Kirk Hartley, Big Law Now Marketing Defense of Global Tort Litigation, and
Adopting the Insurance Industry Tactic of Marketing a Theme of Fraud, GLOBALTORT (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.globaltort.com /2010/12/big-law-now-marketing-defense-of-globaltort-litigation-and-adopting-theinsurance-industry-tactic-of-marketing-a-theme-of-fraud/)
(discussing mass tort defense firms’ marketing tactics).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

35

426

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:391

cases. Even in Libby, Montana—a community that has been plagued by more
asbestos personal injuries per capita than any other—the specious claiming practices
that historically dominated asbestos litigation have contributed to community
sentiment against not only the litigation but also those victims who advance
legitimate claims in litigation.162 Documented evidence of claim manufacturing in
the South American banana plantation proceedings have likewise been largely
effective at shifting the focus from the defendant’s widespread use of dangerous
pesticides to the perceived greed of the lawyers and plaintiffs involved.163
Moreover, where defendants actually discover strong evidence of misconduct or
manipulation, they may enjoy additional leverage in efforts to reduce their aggregate
liability. In the aforementioned Silica MDL, for example, defendants successfully
identified numerous obvious abuses with respect to the medical and other evidence
supporting large blocks of silicosis claims.164 Even though individual silicosis
claims have been advanced for decades, the conclusion that such a substantial
majority of the claims were “manufactured for money”165 tainted the entire claim
pool and continues to haunt true victims’ efforts to pursue their rights today.
In transforming the popular perception of civil litigation from a means of
advancing justice into a mechanism devoted primarily, if not exclusively, on
transferring resources, the perception of tort law has also been transformed from a
means of empowering the weak and injured to a mechanism for one group of
powerful elites (the controlling lawyers) to transfer wealth to no one so much as
themselves.166 The success of this transformation is as much a product of
aggregation’s focus on wealth redistribution, empowering lawyers at the expense of
individual plaintiffs’ voice and exit options, and the systemic reluctance to reign in
entrepreneurial litigation practices as any orchestrated campaign by defendants. The
problem is not so much that defendants are exploiting their rights to highlight any
distortions they uncover; it is that the practices that define entrepreneurial mass tort
plaintiffs’ practice and weaknesses in modern mass tort governance encourage these
distortions and make the defendants’ task too easy.
B. Plaintiff Rights, Attorney Dominance, and Legitimacy
As suggested previously, the acceleration of claim recruiting and filing,
discovery and settlement under the quasi-class action model may generate a

162
Heather Orom et al., A Typology of Communication Dynamics in Families Living a
Slow-Motion Technological Disaster, 33 J. FAM. ISSUES 1299, 1310-16 (Oct. 2012) (noting
community and family criticism that tracks broader criticism concerning the merits of asbestos
litigation and generates doubts about the truthfulness and integrity of individual claimants).
163
See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Litigation Fraud Allegations Hotly Disputed in Dole
Banana Case, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 1, 2010.
164

In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005).

165

Id.

166
Accord John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 603 (2005) (“[T]he
relentless monetization of redress has arguably introduced pathologies, including the
commodification of injuries, and the transformation of some plaintiffs' lawyers from victimrepresentatives to injury entrepreneurs.”).
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“distorted”167 life cycle for a mass tort. Plaintiffs who may have had the will and
support necessary to advance their cases to conclusion in the absence of multidistrict
consolidation—the same type of plaintiffs whose litigation uncovered the farreaching misconduct of the asbestos industry—will find them delayed and more
difficult to advance successfully. The maturity promised by the aggressive litigation
of their rights may be replaced with pre-mature settlements based on repeat player
preferences.
The practical effect is a transformation from appropriately adversarial civil
litigation to a process structured to value the litigation rights that will inevitably be
sold.168 The pretrial work of multidistrict litigation is frequently characterized as
establishing or aiding lead counsel and defendants in establishing rough values for
the claims to be settled.169 In any matrix-based settlement, these efforts will allow
defendants and lead counsel to distinguish those rights—the goods—to be sold from
those that will be treated as non-conforming and rejected. The global settlement
agreement captures these terms, subject only to the approval of the true owners of
the rights, which may be achieved through coercion, controlling the information
available to plaintiffs and drowning out dissent through flooding the claim pool. To
the extent that “aggregate settlements derive their legitimacy from client
autonomy,”170 the coercive force of aggregate practice and quasi-class action
settlement171 render them substantively suspect even if they preserve some technical
conception of autonomy.
Even where the rough presumption that aggregation improves total recovery
holds true in practice, “tort law is not simply a device for transferring wealth, and
good lawyers are not simply maximizers of average payout.”172 Compensation and
deterrence are valuable social ends of tort law, but “the claim tort law provides
against the tortfeasor is not precisely a means to that end.”173 The power to control
the litigation, including the initial decision to pursue litigation at all, belongs and
remains with the client. And to “lose the right to decide whether to settle one's
167
Frances E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821
1844 (1995) (noting that such premature consolidations may “perpetuate a distorted version of
a mass tort”).
168

Others have drawn similar observations concerning global mass tort settlements. See
generally William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
413 (2001); accord, L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class
Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 163 (2004)
(discussing the potential for collusive settlements in the mass tort settlement context).
169
See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that
bellwether trials “can be beneficial for litigants who desire to settle such claims by providing
information on the value of the cases as reflected by the jury verdicts”); Fallon, supra note 46,
at 2342 (“[B]ellwether trials essentially supply counsel with ‘raw’ data around which a more
fair and equitable grid-based compensation system can ultimately be constructed.”).
170

Erichson, supra note 21, at 530 n.40.

171

Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 941, 977-78 (1995).
172

Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 312.

173

Id.
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claim, and on what terms, is to lose control of that claim in a very real sense.”174
Placing these decisions in the hands of predictable repeat players may accelerate
resolution, but this efficiency comes at the cost of denying plaintiffs access to
digestible and unbiased information, independent and loyal representation and
meaningful opportunities for voice and exit.
If we assume that all plaintiffs really want in litigation is compensation, then
aggregation holds far more promise than leaving individual plaintiffs to their own
devices. This assumption, however, presumes more than the available information
can establish.175 As one commentator noted recently, compensation alone fails “to
heal the deep wounds of many clients.”176 Dr. Tamara Relis likewise recently
observed that “the bulk of lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants have similar
conceptions of why plaintiffs have sued in a particular case—the reason being solely
or predominantly for money” while “claimants desires for acknowledgments of
harm, retribution for defendant conduct, admissions of fault, prevention of
reoccurrences, answers and apologies remain invisible to most lawyers throughout
the litigation and mediation of these cases.”177 Indeed, although a majority of the
traditional tort plaintiffs in the Relis study identified compensation as at least a
secondary goal of litigation, less than one quarter of the plaintiffs identified
compensation as their primary (18%) or sole (6%) objective in the case.178
As in class action litigation, passive plaintiff majorities “appear to be behaving
out of apathy or rational ignorance rather than making a considered choice not to opt
out or object.”179 There may be an “overwhelming market demand for en masse
representation”180 among these plaintiffs, but this passive majority is so readily
manufactured in modern practice that it tells us little about how those with
internalized injuries and a firm commitment to vindicating their rights assess the
litigation and settlement. Moreover, this simple majority preference neither justifies
the wholesale coercive surrender of individual rights nor the characterization of
174

Id. at 313.

175

See Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
355, 378 (2003) (“For example, in cases concerning widespread worker exposure to asbestos,
liability for a particular person's injuries is sometimes determined without a hearing, using
answers to a questionnaire regarding exposure to asbestos. The courts use this approach to
distribute settlements to large groups of victims quickly. However, instead of gratefully
receiving their rapid settlements, injured parties have been angered by the denial of their ‘day
in court.’ In other words, an effort by the judicial system to reform in order to better meet the
needs of the public has not been successful due to an inaccurate understanding of what people
really want in this situation.”); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement
of Mass Tort Claim, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 199-205 (1990).
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Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135,
1136 (2000).
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Tamara Relis, "It's Not About the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs'
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706-07 (2007).
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Id. at 723.
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those who choose to advance individual cases as “self-indulgent”181 or
extortionists.182 Even if we accept that some of those who insist upon taking a
different course have nefarious motives or are falling prey to lawyers advancing their
own agendas, it is a stunning logical leap to presume that all that reject the
majority’s preference are so morally bankrupt or easily manipulated.
The reaction of the relatives of those killed in the World Trade Center to the 9/11
Victims Compensation Fund (VCF) provides a vivid reminder of the value of these
rights in the mass tort context. Viewed purely from a compensation standpoint, the
VCF was exceptional—promising “a fast, guaranteed payment . . . comparable to
what they might recover if they won in court”183 —so much so that “most expected
them to accept the offer in droves.”184 In spite of these benefits, many of those
eligible for compensation were reluctant to participate and delayed claim filing until
shortly before the deadline.185
Although others suggested a variety of explanations for the reluctance to file, a
study conducted by Gillian Hadfield showed that “the choice between accepting a
payment from the Fund and going to court was not exclusively, or even primarily,
framed as a financial calculation.”186 For many of these claimants, the decision:
involved not an easy trade-off between a guaranteed dollar payment and a
gamble on a “pot of gold,” but a deeply troubling trade-off between
money and a host of nonmonetary values that respondents thought they
might obtain from litigation. These values included information from
otherwise inaccessible sources (the decision makers who determined
airline and World Trade Center fire safety procedures, for example),
accountability in the sense of public judgment about whether those on
181

Id.

182

As Erichson and Zipursky noted in discussing the Vioxx settlement:

[A]nother suggestion here requires careful examination: the charge of extortion—the
suggestion that those refusing to settle their claims are obviously merely manipulative
hold-outs, that these claimaints must recognize proposed settlements as perfectly
acceptable and desirable and, by holding out, are simply trying to squeeze more out of
the defendant at the cost of everyone around them. . . . It would be naive to deny that
some allegedly reluctant claimants are like this, but we find no reason to suppose that
only a manipulative claimant would reject the settlement agreement. Claimants have
different risk tolerances, different litigation objectives, different satisficing levels, and
different evaluations of the strength of their own claims. Moreover, settlements treat
claimants differently, leaving some better compensated than others. Claimants may
place different values on certainty and may differ in their evaluation of the certainty
that settlement provides. On the facts of Vioxx, the claimants had very little sense of
how much money they would obtain from a settlement. There is good reason to think
that some of them genuinely wanted to take Merck to trial rather than accept an utterly
indefinite settlement.
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 62, at 318.
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whom victims depended for their safety did their jobs, and responsive
policy change—making sure that lessons were learned and heeded in the
future.187
Hadfield’s study provides a stark example of the popular perception of civil
litigation rights. That victims prized their rights to litigate is evident not only in their
reluctance to sacrifice the rights but also in the way that they framed this reluctance.
These rights represented the potential for compensation in tort, but they also
represented the ability to serve their communities in a unique way.188 When faced
with the choice of ensuring compensation that was comparable to what they would
receive in tort or retaining the right, even those with compelling personal needs for
compensation struggled with the decision and were “heartbroken and ashamed”189
when they capitulated to the certainty of the VCF.190 Hadfield concluded that civil
litigation rights represented more to these victims “than a means to satisfying private
material ends; it represents principled participation in a process that is constitutive of
a community.”191
Although it may be tempting to characterize the ultimately high participation
rates with the fund as “a widespread endorsement of money over litigation or an
ultimate acceding to the financial frame offered by Congress, VCF personnel, and
the legal profession,” the study directly undermines these characterizations.192 As
Hadfield noted, “Many felt that they had been bought off, induced to forego
litigation in order to protect the government, the airlines, or other corporate
entities.”193 And a “significant majority of respondents felt that it was wrong that the
VCF design required them to waive their right to pursue civil litigation as a
condition of receiving money through the VCF.”194
The reality that awaits victims in quasi-class multidistrict litigation is, as noted,
more likely to resemble the compelled acceptance of such a “payoff” than the 9/11
victims’ idealized vision of civil litigation. And though the vast majority of
respondents “felt that the limitation of liability, the effort to prevent lawsuits, and the
requirement that victims and their families choose between money and lawsuits were

187

Id. at 647-48.

188

Id. at 661 (concluding that many saw their litigation rights as a uniquely powerful tool
for gaining an understanding of what went wrong and why, so that we might “change things to
prevent this from happening again”). As Hadfield noted, “the choice as they saw it was it was
about relinquishing gold in favor of something they saw as more important,” even though they
knew they faced an uphill battle in court. Id. at 662.
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Id. at 663.
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Id. at 665 (finding that a majority of respondents who ultimately submitted claims to the
VCF found it “somewhat” or “very” hard to do so, with these decisions frequently “driven by
a capitulation to reality and brute facts”).
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steps no future Congress should take,”195 these are steps that quasi-class actions
demand in the largest mass tort cases.
Collectively, the exclusion of plaintiffs’ voices, dominance of lead counsel, and
negative perceptions of the practices employed by some of these entrepreneurial
lawyers undermines the long-term legitimacy of the quasi-class action model. The
irony in the efforts to transform multidistrict litigation into a quasi-class action is
that it exaggerates the features of class action practice that served as the core talking
points in building support for the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).196 And though
multidistrict consolidation may never draw the same attention of the special interests
that successfully lobbied for CAFA, the political effort to limit class actions was
viable only because these talking points rung true with the public. While CAFA
may have marked an important legislative shift in class action practice, the battle
over the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the class action device appears to
have been lost long before CAFA.197
V. RECOMMENDATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND LIMITATIONS
The problem with mass tort aggregation is not so much that it wholly supplants
traditional civil litigation; it is that it captures many of traditional litigation’s
weaknesses and introduces new ones. Although individual plaintiffs in traditional
civil litigation frequently defer to the expertise and advice of counsel, they retain the
power to control and guide their own cases. In empowering a select group of
lawyers to control multidistrict proceedings, the preceding demonstrates that
plaintiffs are neither individually nor collectively empowered to exert control over
critical collective decisions in a similar fashion. They have no meaningful voice in
matters that are relevant to the disposition of their claims, and their exit options are
effectively limited.
The question, then, is how to empower plaintiffs without undermining the
efficiencies of aggregation. Empowering every plaintiff to opine on every step,
evaluate every confidential document and deposition, or effectively veto any global
settlement would mark a descent into chaos. Class actions ostensibly address this
concern by designating one or more representative plaintiffs, but the characteristic
that defines the need for multidistrict rather than class treatment—substantial
variations within the claim pool—also suggests that purely representative
governance will fail to capture the objective claim distinctions and subjective
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Id. at 669.
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Erichson, supra note 143, at 1596-1602.
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As Professor Lahav noted in 2003,
The pervasive criticisms against class actions—which fall mostly in the lap of
plaintiffs’ side class action attorneys—are damaging to the legal profession and to
the regulatory purpose of the class action mechanisms. Commentators who
oppose class action litigation often point to lawyer control as the reason for
eliminating class actions. Studies and opinion polls have found that the public
believes that lawyers are greedier and more dishonest than other professionals.
The bad press concerning class action litigation has not helped this image.
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preferences of the plaintiffs. In sum, plaintiff empowerment may sound nice in
theory, but it promises to be exceptionally difficult in practice.
To address this question, this Part proposes a framework for collective voice and
oversight that mirrors the approach used in complex corporate bankruptcy
proceedings. As in multidistrict litigation, these proceedings tend to involve
creditors with diverse and conflicting individual interests, limited incentives for
individual creditors to monitor and police the proceedings on their own, and a high
potential for repeat players to assume control over the case in a manner that
undermines the interests of the claim pool. Although this proposal is complicated by
the obvious distinctions between complex bankruptcy and mass tort proceedings, it
nonetheless provides a useful starting point for resolving the problems that arise in a
system that marginalizes plaintiffs.
A. A Model for Collective Voice in Quasi-Class Action
1. Creditors’ Committees in Chapter 11
At its core, bankruptcy is a straightforward common pool problem: the
bankrupt’s creditors have both a shared interest in maximizing the size of the
debtor’s assets available for distribution and antagonistic interests in maximizing
their individual distributions from those assets. If these creditors remain free to
pursue whatever recourse is available to them outside of bankruptcy, history
demonstrates that creditors will “race to the courthouse” to advance their individual
interests even if the collective impact of this race is to reduce their aggregate returns.
Thus, if bankruptcy law is to achieve whatever vision of equitable distribution it is
designed to advance, it must curtail creditors’ self-help options.
The bankruptcy structure provides a vehicle for creditors to express their
collective voice—by way of one or more official committees comprised of creditors
selected by the Office of the United States Trustee—throughout the bankruptcy case.
These committees may exercise a level of influence over the proceedings that few
individual creditors can match, even if the individual creditors have the resources
and resolve to do so. At the same time, individual creditors are expressly authorized
to object to any matter that affects their interests, may be authorized to proceed with
their individual collection efforts upon satisfaction of certain conditions, and have
the right to vote on any Chapter 11 plan that alters their interests in any way. To that
end, although bankruptcy preempts traditional litigant discretion and control, it does
so in a way that respects and strengthens creditor voice rather than stifles it.
Specifically, under section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. Trustee is
charged with appointing one or more official creditors’ committees “as soon as
practicable” after the commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. This
typically involves sending solicitation letters and questionnaires to the unsecured
creditors identified by the debtor in its Chapter 11 petition.198 The U.S. Trustee
subsequently reviews completed questionnaires and selects committee members that
best reflect the creditor body, both in terms of type and amount of claims held.
Once formed, the committee has the power to retain counsel and other necessary
professionals of the committee’s choice, which will be approved by the court barring
198
For a more detailed account of this process, see Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert,
Creditors' Committee Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J.
229 (2003).
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any disqualifying conflicts of interest. This selection process—the so-called “beauty
contest”—typically involves the committee hearing brief presentations from
potential representatives, which tend to emphasize the lawyer’s qualifications and
strategies for protecting creditor interests. Once selected, the lawyer owes fiduciary
duties to the committee rather than any individual creditor or committee member.
The bankruptcy estate pays the reasonable fees and expenses of professionals
selected to represent the committee, as well as the reasonable expenses incurred by
committee members in connection with their service on the committee. By contrast,
any fees or expenses associated with any committee member’s efforts to collect on
its claims or litigate other matters in its individual capacity are the responsibility of
the committee member alone. Thus, committee members do not pay any of the costs
incurred in connection with the committee’s performance of its duties, but they
remain responsible for the costs of advancing their individual interests in the case.
To that end, committee members typically hire their own separate counsel to
advance their own interests in the case and maintain separation between their work
as a member of the committee and these individual interests.
Creditors’ committees can play a critical role in the cases in which they are
appointed. They serve as a “statutory watchdog,”199 charged with investigating and
monitoring the debtor in possession’s conduct.200 Bankruptcy judges tend to place
tremendous weight on the committees’ opinions concerning significant proposals
and contested matters; so much so that sensible debtor’s counsel will at least try to
resolve any conflicts with the committees before seeking court approval. Ideally, the
debtor and the committee will work closely throughout the case to frame any
ultimate plan of reorganization and, in some cases, may be able to resolve issues to
the point that they propose a joint plan for court approval.
Notwithstanding its potential, the available data concerning the degree to which
the bankruptcy committee structure helps to improve outcomes in Chapter 11 cases
is mixed. In one study, Stephen Lubben suggests that the appointment of a creditor’s
committee tends to suggest strong creditor interest and, accordingly, a lower
probability of failure.201 In another study, Michelle Harner and Jamie Marincic
analyzed 296 Chapter 11 cases across six jurisdictions and supplemental survey data
from committee members and professionals.202 The authors found that cases with
only one official committee fared worse in terms of restructuring success and
distribution to creditors than cases with no committees and cases with multiple
committees.203 Accordingly, their proposals included greater use of “multiple
199

See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganization, 64 VAND. L. REV.
749, n.68 (2011) (noting the common reference to official committees as “statutory
watchdogs”).
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committees, categorical single committees and more robust disclosures that target
that goal.”204 The authors concluded, “By striving to give more creditors a stronger,
more informed voice on committees, the committee structure could help protect the
process from the often subtle and questionable influence of just a few.”205
The beauty of the bankruptcy committee structure is its potential as a framework
for empowering those who have strong incentives to monitor, spreading the costs of
monitoring across the claim pool, and providing clear parameters for designated
peers to speak for the group. Individual claimants may still monitor and participate
in the case on their own, but they may also choose to rely upon the committee to
protect their interests with respect to the big picture matters that tend to dominate
these cases. At the same time, the committee, as the collective voice of the claim
pool, should enjoy far more influence in critical negotiations and contested matters
than any individual creditor.
2. Constitution and Functions of Plaintiffs’ Oversight Committees
Conceptually, a formal plaintiffs’ oversight committee (POC) can serve a
similarly valuable role in quasi-class action, though, as demonstrated in bankruptcy,
demands careful attention to several key questions. First, it is necessary to clearly
define the POC’s purpose. In bankruptcy, official committees are charged with
representing the collective interests of their constituencies by challenging actions
that might dissipate the estate’s assets or unduly elevate some creditors above others.
In the quasi-class action context, the POC should serve a similarly broad purpose—
advancing the shared interests of the claim pool, challenging decisions and
settlement terms that unduly elevate or undermine the interests of sub-groups, taking
steps to improve cohesion within the pool where possible, and improving plaintiffs’
access to the information necessary to allow them to make informed decisions about
their respective claims. In contrast to the nominal representative plaintiff in class
action litigation, however, this role is focused on improving collective voice and
facilitating access to information that will promote informed individual decisions
rather than identifying a figurehead206 whose presence may be used to rationalize
coercion.
This conception of what the POC’s objectives will be should provide some
guidance with respect to the next question: Who will make up the POC? As the
Harner and Marincic study suggests, any proposal must pay close attention to the
need to improve voice across the diverse claim pool and limit potential capture by
those seeking to manipulate the committee process to advance their individual or
sub-group interests at the expense of the group. This need to incorporate the views
of a potentially diverse group of plaintiffs, however, must be balanced against the
204
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need to keep the size of the committee manageable. In short, a committee that is too
small may not be representative of the claim pool at large, but a committee with too
many members may find it difficult to hold regular conferences and have the
discussions necessary to shape and advance its objectives.
Moreover, committee turnover is always a possibility in any aggregate
proceeding. Given the potential that some POC members may settle their claims
during the course of the MDL, the framework must account for replacing committee
members who no longer have an interest in the case. This potential to settle with
individual plaintiffs as the case advances also raises the specter of POC members (or
their counsel) using their appointments to obtain unduly favorable settlements of
their own claims at the expense of the claim pool. In sum, the POC must be
structured carefully to avoid capture, depletion of critical voices within the
committee, and disloyalty by one or more members.
Perhaps the most complex question is how this framework can be structured to
empower the POC to fulfill its objectives. Mass tort litigation is in many ways more
complex and uncertain than corporate bankruptcy and involves creditors who tend to
be less sophisticated in legal matters than the typical unsecured business creditor.
This suggests that the POC will require, at a minimum, representation or other
guidance by experienced, independent counsel or a “special officer”207 in the course
of its work. To effectively fulfill its obligations and reach its potential, the
framework must also be designed to provide the POC with timely access to
information concerning the progress of the case, including any settlement
negotiations, and a forum for communicating its views with – and obtaining input
from – other plaintiffs.
Although conceptually promising, the preceding discussion demonstrates
significant obstacles to applying a plaintiff-centered governance model to mass tort
aggregation.
3. Selection of Committee Representatives
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty in such a proposal is identifying and
appointing potential committee members in a manner that adds value without
introducing new avenues for abuse. Those with potential claims can be identified
and solicited for committee membership early in virtually any aggregative
proceeding. Nonetheless, the U.S. Trustee controls this decision in bankruptcy, and
there is no comparable organization in other forms of aggregation. This task must
thus fall to courts, the lawyers the courts will oversee, or the decision of the claim
pool. At this stage, counsel have a strong interest in selecting passive plaintiffs for
committee appointments and, given their capacity to flood the pool,208 may also be in
position to manipulate any vote. To that end, notwithstanding the potential conflict
with democratic principles, it may be necessary at this point to place this
responsibility in either the supervising court or some other judicial body.
A committee is, of course, only as representative and independent as its
members, so the criteria for selection of committee members must be framed
carefully. In this respect, judges should attempt to identify willing plaintiffs who
have demonstrated both a commitment to active involvement in the case and ensure
207
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that the plaintiffs selected provide a fair representation of the diverse interests
present in the case. To control for the potential for capture, courts should limit the
number of plaintiffs with direct or indirect relationships with lead counsel or other
parties in the case or on the committee. Likewise, to avoid the infusion of claimants
who are interested more in any fee they can obtain from serving in this capacity,
committee member compensation, if any, should be tied to work actually performed
in connection with the case.
4. Responsibilities
The primary function of committee members would be to direct and oversee the
work of hired professionals, provide a forum for committed plaintiffs to voice their
concerns, and generate truly plaintiff-centered assessments of common benefit fund
assessments and allocation and other key developments in the case. They would
have access to all discovery and receive periodic reports from lead and committee
counsel concerning the progress of the case. Lead counsel would be required to
submit any proposed settlement to the committee prior to submission to the claim
pool. After a global settlement is reached, the plaintiffs’ oversight committee would
be asked to analyze and produce a report to plaintiffs concerning their individual and
collective views of the risks and benefits of litigation and settlement.
Another function of the plaintiffs’ oversight committee would be to actively
encourage ongoing communication and cooperation within the claim pool. As
Elizabeth Burch recently observed, this coming together at an early stage where their
respective objectives in the litigation can be focused on shared goals “can strengthen
group cohesion” and, ultimately, may improve their willingness to come together on
other matters.209 And, as discussed below, building this community cohesion at this
early stage may not only improve collective oversight of the process but also
encourage greater participation in and satisfaction with global settlement.
5. Committee Counsel
Given the scientific, procedural and legal complexities associated with these
cases, counsel will often be necessary to assist the committee in monitoring, framing
its objections, and communicating its views with the court and the claim pool. As
with retained counsel in bankruptcy cases, committee counsel in this context may
enjoy considerable influence and, accordingly, should not have or represent any
party that has an interest in the case. Although this condition might unduly limit the
pool of viable counsel in cases that have evolved and matured over an extended
period of time, in which case experience in the field may be both necessary and
disqualifying, this should not be a concern in the vast majority of mass tort cases that
are consolidated shortly after a triggering event today.
Ideally, committee counsel’s compensation should not be tied to any settlement
due to the risk that any advice may be tainted by the lawyer’s interest in being paid.
Such a conflict is unlikely in bankruptcy because the Code expressly provides for
compensation of professionals on an interim basis during the course of the case.210
As noted previously, compensation in other forms of non-class aggregation tends to
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be decided by the judge only after settlement,211 and the legal basis for compensating
counsel in multidistrict litigation is far from certain. Notwithstanding this
uncertainty, the current trend toward recognizing the propriety of common benefit
funds even outside the class action context and the extraordinary competition for
these roles suggests that the risk of nonpayment should not be a significant barrier to
obtaining qualified counsel for committee counsel and other professionals.
B. Advantages in Litigation and Settlement
1. Plaintiff Monitoring and Conflicts of Interest
As noted previously, the multiple layers of lawyers between many plaintiffs and
lead counsel in multidistrict mass tort litigation and the range of conflicts of interest
at each level limits individual plaintiffs’ options for monitoring and having their
voice heard in the proceedings. It is well settled that individual plaintiffs lack
sufficient power and resources to challenge large corporate wrongdoers effectively
in civil litigation, yet we tend to rely on ethical regimes and the virtually nonexistent threat of ethical enforcement or malpractice litigation to somehow protect
plaintiffs from similarly powerful and well-funded entrepreneurial plaintiffs’
lawyers. Although modern aggregation has given rise to a plaintiffs’ bar that can
match the most powerful defendants in terms of resources and expertise, it has not,
to date, provided plaintiffs with a sufficient mechanism for protecting their own
interests when they conflict with the bar.
The oversight committee approach fills this void by empowering plaintiffs to
have voice as a group, both within the proceedings and as a matter of coordinating
and reconciling their conflicting perspectives. Instead of the scattering of random
voices expressed through diverse avenues that may never reach decision makers
today, such a unified framework for plaintiffs to come together and affirm or reject
decisions that directly influence their interests. In so doing, it matches the same
basic design of civil litigation generally—collective oversight for litigation of their
collective interests instead of individual oversight of an individual case—and
provides the assistance necessary to make this collective oversight viable.
2. Improved Decision Making in Settlement
As noted previously, the practical limits on direct plaintiff education concerning
their prospective recoveries under a global settlement and risks at trial reduce the
prospects that individual plaintiffs will make informed settlement or opt out
decisions. Although steering committee and individual counsel employ town hall
sessions and similar efforts to advance their visions of the case collectively, these
sessions are frequently one-sided affairs that either praise or vilify the settlement
according to the preferences of counsel.
In fostering group cohesion and direct dialogue amongst victims, the committee
proposal addresses these shortcomings. By virtue of their shared status as victims,
plaintiffs may enjoy a level of credibility and potential for group cohesion that
outsiders—including their own counsel—do not.212 They can speak to their concerns
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at a level of understanding that even experienced counsel fail to appreciate.213 The
proposed framework promotes and provides a clear forum for group deliberation,
which can improve their willingness and ability to cooperate.214 Rather than relying
upon the potential for informal groups to form, develop an action plan, and advance
the group’s interests on an ad hoc basis,215 the committee structure provides a clear
framework for the group to develop information, share it with the claim pool, and
ensure that any global settlement truly reflects their interests. And in supporting this
group with independent counsel who effectively fills the role of “special officer,”
this structure can better ensure that the group evolves in a manner focused on
advancing plaintiffs’ interests and avoids capture by individual parties or repeat
players.216
Individual plaintiffs remain free to accept or reject the oversight committee’s
opinions under this proposal, but even those who reject the committee’s views stand
to benefit from the additional information and input. These insights, tailored toward
emphasizing matters critical to similarly situated and dissimilar plaintiffs alike, can
encourage plaintiffs to internalize critical aspects of their claims—to see them as
more than a mere ticket to recovery but as a means of vindicating their rights—and
suggest, overtly or otherwise, questions they should ask of themselves and their
counsel before committing to a course of action. At the same time, it allows
plaintiffs to tell their own stories in a forum that will, by its nature, be widely
distributed and publicized; which can serve to improve a plaintiff’s understanding of
her own claims as well as the claims of others within the group.
C. Potential Objections and Limitations
Any framework that fundamentally alters existing practices necessarily involves
integration issues that must be addressed before implementation. In bankruptcy, for
example, the precise design of the modern committee structure was premised upon
creditor oversight provisions that existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898217 and
was refined to account for decades of experience and several detailed inquiries into
the shortcomings of those provisions.218 Multidistrict litigation, however, has no
comparable plaintiff oversight mechanism and involves administrative issues that
213
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may be more complex. Given the focus of this proposal as a first-stage proof of
concept, however, this section focuses less on objections to specific aspects of the
proposal than on conceptual objections.
1. Plaintiff Sophistication and Participation
One fear is that mass tort plaintiffs may lack sufficient sophistication to oversee
the process effectively, though this fear may say more about those who express it
than the shortcomings of the victims themselves. Few issues in even the most
complex litigation, however, are beyond the comprehension of most men and
women, assuming, of course, that their counselors provide competent guidance and
counsel. Our civil litigation system, of course, relies upon lay juries to decide
similarly complex cases, and the professional’s job in advising clients is arguably far
less complex and provides greater flexibility in clarifying any ambiguities and
confusion.
The systemic and pervasive skepticism of plaintiffs’ capacity to make decisions
concerning matters that may have profound and lasting effects on their daily lives
says more about the elite-centered culture of litigation and academia than it does
about the plaintiffs themselves. In the Deepwater Horizon case, for example, we
should expect that at least some of the affected plaintiffs have an extensive
understanding of oil drilling, environmental science, and other technical issues that
likely far exceed that of the lawyers controlling the case. Similarly, given the reach
of the Toyota Sudden Acceleration MDL, at least some of the affected plaintiffs are
likely to have far superior expertise in the relevant engineering, economics and other
disciplines than the lawyers advancing their interests.
This skepticism reflects less a fear that plaintiffs will make decisions that run
contrary to their own objectives than the prospect that they will have perspectives
that differ from lead counsel and transferee courts. Improving access to information
strips away some of the lawyer’s information advantage in the relationship, but it
does not do so in a way that undermines the ostensible role of lawyer as agent. To
that end, empowering plaintiffs through improving access to information is
consistent with substantive law. In sum, the objection here is less one with its
consistency with applicable law than it is with the manner in which that law places
control in the hands of those who are harmed.
Another difficulty with this proposal is that it depends upon the presence of
plaintiffs who are not only committed to advancing the litigation but also stepping
forward as independent representatives of the community of plaintiffs. This
framework will presumably be limited where few, if any, plaintiffs would name and
blame and thus never claim in the absence of aggregation. Just as there is no onesize-fits-all mass tort case, the approach to governance in mass tort litigation must
conform to the needs and preferences of the plaintiffs. Indeed, official committees
are not appointed in many small Chapter 11 cases because creditors simply do not
have sufficient stakes to justify participation. And if no plaintiffs can be bothered to
oversee a case, this fact alone has value in telling us about the claiming commitment
of the claim pool and may support an approach that looks far more like modern
governance by counsel than this proposal.
Even in cases where plaintiffs are unable or unwilling to take a direct role, their
absence may be offset to a degree by reserving most or all steering committee and
other leadership roles for those attorneys who represent distinct plaintiff subgroups
exclusively and preferring traditional plaintiffs’ lawyers over mass tort repeat
players. Although a lawyer’s clients may consent to representation by counsel who
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represent others with conflicting interests, this consent is not always readily apparent
and, in any case, cannot be assumed beyond the lawyer’s own clients. In shaping
leadership committees to reflect these distinct interests and reducing the prospects of
control by repeat players, the leadership should not only advance their shared
interests but also promote arms-length balancing of their antagonistic interests in any
settlement.
2. Committee Counsel Domination
Given the relative complexity of mass tort litigation, and the need for competent
counsel to guide the committee, the risk that repeat player committee counsel will
come to dominate the proceedings to their own benefit cannot be overlooked. This
risk, however, is tempered by the fact that committee counsel will be appointed by
and subject to the direct control of committee members who are not, of course,
repeat players. As in bankruptcy, this risk can be further limited by excluding
lawyers who represent individual plaintiffs in the matter or have extensive
overlapping interests with other repeat players involved in the case.
3. Waste and Delay
The use of formal committees is not, of course, without cost. Bankruptcy
committee professional fees frequently run into the millions in the largest cases, and
their work appears, at times, to be duplicative of debtors’ counsel.219 The need for
independent counsel necessarily involves costs.
Likewise, regular report
preparation, information sharing, development of communication strategies across
the claim pool, preparation of the POC’s assessment of any proposed settlement, and
other functions will entail costs and, at times, may draw lead counsel’s attention
away from the important work of investigating and litigating the case. And adding
another layer of bureaucracy into aggregate governance may introduce a variety of
other costs and delays that are difficult to predict at the outset.
For some, these risks alone are sufficient to reject any sort of plaintiff-centered
governance proposal. Indeed, instead of addressing the power disparity between
plaintiffs and the lawyers who dominate aggregate litigation, recent proposals
attempt to expand it by eradicating the last remaining vestige of plaintiff autonomy
by placing the final settlement decision in the hands of counsel. The American Law
Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Aggregate Litigation, for example, seeks to bind
plaintiffs to the collective decision of the claim pool through advance consent.220 As
demonstrated, the raw majority vote proposal is so readily manipulated by
accelerated recruiting practices as to effectively provide lead counsel unfettered
control under the modern framework. Combined with the ex ante consent provision,
this approach would render the effort to strip plaintiffs’ power over the decisions that
will forever alter their rights complete.

219
Much of this duplication, however, stems from the fact that creditors’ committees are
often adverse to the debtor in possession. Where matters are contested, for example, they will
hire competing experts to evaluate critical questions. The POC model, on the other hand, does
not envision a similarly adverse relationship. Rather, the POC’s role should be far more
cooperative than seen in complex bankruptcy matters, with conflicts limited to areas that
directly involve protecting the claim pool’s interests.
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Rather than continue the “ongoing search for novel ways to bind individual mass
tort plaintiffs to outcomes by which they do not affirmatively agree to be bound . . .
or do not affirmatively support,”221 the collective objectives of substantive tort law
are better served by expanding plaintiff monitoring, group building, and providing
victims with an additional forum for obtaining the information they need to make
informed decisions. Indeed, many of the problems that have been identified in mass
tort litigation have their origins in the historical emphasis on efficiency without
adequate attention to the other objectives of substantive and procedural law. The
claim manufacturing practices that ultimately defined the silica mass tort and fueled
asbestos litigation for more than a decade were, in most respects, a model of
efficiency even as they reinforced the worst public perceptions of mass tort practice
and lawyers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Quasi-class aggregation yields complex and interrelated concerns. It generates
several layers of conflicts of interest and may accelerate recruiting practices that
introduce dubious and passive claims. Moreover, in delaying plaintiffs’ practical
opportunities for voice and exit until after a global settlement is reached, long-term
multidistrict consolidations may coerce acceptance of unfavorable settlement terms
at the expense of individual plaintiffs’ legitimate private interests. Even if we accept
that quasi-class aggregation is necessary, overseen by men and women of high
personal integrity and capable of superior economic recoveries to other forms of
aggregation, these costs are too often ignored. Theories of legal practice tend to
collapse under the day-to-day realities and demands of the moment; even those who
have strong personal and professional ethics are susceptible to ethical blind spots and
rationalizations. And the mere preference of the majority may be of little comfort to
plaintiffs who find their cases delayed, rights altered, and voices muted in the
inexorable march toward settlement.
It is easy to characterize a plaintiff-centered approach as placing too much faith
in the capacity of ordinary citizens to carry the weight necessary to realize its full
potential. The same could be said of civil litigation generally or, given the collective
barriers to exit and voice, even the marginal opportunities for meaningful
involvement in the current quasi-class action model. But where vindication of their
injuries matters most to plaintiffs, either as a matter of individual right or community
responsibility, procedural empowerment reinforces rather than rejects or dampens
the expectation and promise of civil litigation and restores the victims’ place within
it. It transforms the dynamics of the choice to oversee the litigation, regardless of
what that choice may be for any given plaintiff. And if that choice is to simply
forego the option of speaking with a collective voice, it is surely more voluntary and
consistent with the principles of democratic governance than a model premised upon
paternalism, usurpation of control and systemic distrust of victims.
Moreover, even if these concerns ultimately foreclose the use of plaintiff
committees in all but a few cases, the foregoing suggests a need for greater
recognition of the potential intra and inter-case conflicts of interest that inhere in
multidistrict consolidation when shaping the steering committees and other
leadership roles within these cases. Each plaintiff is entitled to voice in the
proceeding, if not directly then by counsel who has both the power to advance the
221
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plaintiff’s antagonistic interests and the incentive to do so zealously. This is true
even if doing so may complicate global settlement negotiations or requires
disaggregation of some portion of the claim pool early in the process or in a manner
that reduces the aggregate settlement premium.
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